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place the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, this article argues that this is an oppor-
tunity to re-open the debate on how best to address the current political stalemate on a Northern
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that at a time when there is so much uncertainty about the protection and safeguarding of rights
with a real risk of lesser rights for fewer people in the United Kingdom, more than ever is the need
to provide an alternative to progress the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This article provides that
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ABSTRACT 
Following the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the 
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"If somebody has proposals . . . let us hear them. If they have a better 
alternative, let us hear it. Let us start . . . by trying to get a resolution 
to the problems that have dogged our society."1 
INTRODUCTION 
Against the backdrop of the Conservative government’s plan to 
replace the Human Rights Act 1998 with a British (UK) Bill of Rights 
and now Brexit, this article aims to provide "a better alternative" to 
the political stalemate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights that has 
"dogged our society."2 The article focuses on ways forward for a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, and critically reflects on what Brexit 
and the government’s proposals mean for such a Bill. Instead of 
viewing these concerning and potentially far-reaching developments 
with despair, this is an opportunity to re-invigorate the discussion 
about progressing the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. 
The UK government’s decision to leave the European Union 
following the narrow referendum outcome (48% voted to remain 
against 52% who voted to leave) alongside its plans to replace the 
Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights has raised serious 
concerns in terms of human rights compliance with international 
standards.3 It is pertinent to note at the outset that the European 
                                                                                                             
* Dr. Anne Smith is a lecturer, Transitional Justice Institute/School of Law, Ulster 
University. Monica McWilliams is Professor of Women’s Studies at the Transitional Justice 
Institute/School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy. She was also the Chief 
Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissioner from 2005 to 2011. This 
article was written in a personal capacity only. Priyamvada Yarnell is a PhD candidate at the 
Transitional Justice Institute. The research has been supported by funding from the Joseph 
Rowntree Charitable Trust. We are grateful to Colin Harvey and Rory O’Connell for 
comments on earlier drafts. A draft of this article was presented at a Workshop on Local, 
Regional, and International Perspectives on Political Settlement at the International Institute 
for the Sociology of Law in Oñati, Spain, July 14-15, 2016. All errors are solely the authors’ 
responsibility. 
1. Peter Robinson, former First Minister, Address at Northern Ireland Assembly, Private 
Members’ Business (July 16, 2013), http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/assembly-business/  
official-report/reports-12-13/16-july-2013/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
2. Id. 
3. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UK: CHANGING 
BRITAIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Oct. 2014), https://www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/  
downloadable%20files/human_rights.pdf; HM Government, The Process of Withdrawing from 
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Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) is a regional legal 
instrument established by the Council of Europe and enforced by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. This distinguishes it 
from EU law, which is enforced by the European Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg. However, the two instruments are interlinked. The case 
has also been made that withdrawal from the ECHR would jeopardize 
a State’s EU membership4 since ratification of the ECHR is a 
condition for entry. Despite the extensive scholarly media 
commentary on (a) the implications of Brexit; (b) the repeal of the 
Human Rights Act; and (c) the possible withdrawal from the ECHR,5 
there has been much less commentary on the implications of all three 
for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement’s proposal for a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland. This article addresses this gap by drawing upon 
the empirical findings of a research project aimed at progressing the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.6 This empirical data resulted from 
conducting twenty-one semi-structured interviews with the main 
political parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly, representatives of 
the UK and Irish governments, civil society, and key stakeholders 
involved in the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and archival research 
                                                                                                             
the European Union (Feb. 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/  
attachment_data/file/503908/54538_EU_Series_No2_Accessible.pdf. 
4. See Vaughne Miller, Is Adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights a 
Condition of European Union Membership?, House of Commons Library, Standard Note, 
SN/IA/6577 (Mar. 25, 2014). 
5. There has been a plethora of blogs on Brexit and a series of reports by the London 
School of Economics European Institute. See LSE Commission on the Future of Britain in 
Europe, LONDON SCH. ECON. EUR. INST. (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstit  
ute/LSE-Commission/LSE-Commission-on-the-Future-of-Britain-in-Europe.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2016); see also Brian Gormally, Fighting the Repeal of the Human Rights Act, COMM. 
ADMIN. JUSTICE (Jun. 2015), http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2015/11/11/Fighting_the_Repeal_  
of_the_Human_Rights_Act(1)2.pdf; Colin R.G Murray, Aoife O’Donoghue & Ben T.C. 
Warwick, Policy Paper: The lace of Northern Ireland within UK Human Rights Reform, (Aug. 
2015),  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2643464; Ed Bates, Christine Bell, Colm O’Cinneide, Fiona 
de Londras, Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou, Sir David Edward, Alan Greene, Paul Johnson & Tobias 
Lock, The Legal Implications of a Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998 and Withdrawal from 
the European Convention on Human Rights (May 12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=  
2605487; Caoilfhionn Gallagher, Gavin Booth, Katie O’Byrne, Anurag Deb & Keina Yoshida, 
Report on the Potential Effects of the Repeal of the Human Rights Act 1998, KRW L. & 
DOUGHTY ST. CHAMBERS, (Feb. 2016), http://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/documents/uploaded-
documents/HRA_NI_FINAL_15_02_16.pdf.  
6. See Anne Smith, Monica McWilliams & Priyamvada Yarnell, Political Capacity 
Building: Advancing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, TRANSITIONAL JUST. INST. (2014), 
https://www.ulster.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/58271/Advancing_a_BOR_NI.pdf. 
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on the issue. Based on the empirical data, this article puts forward 
proposals on how best to progress the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights 
set against the current UK government’s proposals to replace the 
Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, as well as Brexit. In 
doing so, this article makes a significant and original contribution on 
several levels: it provides material arguing for the advancement of a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and offers a way forward by 
identifying the issues needing to be addressed by the British and Irish 
governments. It also proposes a policy framework that could lead to 
greater coherence in the British and Irish governments’ approach to a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.7 Finally, the article has broader 
resonance for scholarly literature and work on "doing human rights" 
in "ethno-nationally"8 divided societies and may be of wider 
theoretical interest for explaining the intricate relationship between 
the protection of human rights reform in the United Kingdom and the 
devolution settlements. 
The article is structured as follows: we begin by briefly 
explaining the particular Northern Ireland context as it shows the 
importance of the rights discourse in "deeply divided societies."9 We 
then set out the various political agreements as well as a range of 
government declarations and consultations on a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights committing the UK government to bring forward legislation 
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. In particular, we focus on the 
1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,10 the 2003 Joint Declaration at 
                                                                                                             
7. Note that other academics have also set out options for the way forward in Northern 
Ireland. See Brice Dickson & Colin Harvey, A Discussion Paper: Enhancing the protection of 
human rights and equality in Northern Ireland: Options for the Way Forward (July 2013) (on 
file with authors). One of the solutions is to legislate for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
The other two proposals are: to “do nothing” and “work with what you have got” for now; and 
the other calls for a new Human Rights and Equality Bill for Northern Ireland enacted by the 
Northern Ireland Executive.  
8. Colin Harvey, Designing a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 60(2) N.I.L.Q 181 
(2009). 
9. AREND LIPJHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE 
EXPLORATION 5 (1980) at 5. 
10. Agreement reached in the multi-party negotiations, Cm 3883 (1998) 37 ILM 751, 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
136652/agreement.pdf [hereinafter Belfast/Good Friday Agreement]. The Agreement resulted 
from the talks in Northern Ireland in 1998, which produced a blueprint for how future 
relationships within and between the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom should be developed. 
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Hillsborough,11 and the 2006 St Andrews Agreement,12 as these 
explicitly set out the UK government’s intentions. This section 
outlines that, despite these declarations, and despite being in receipt 
of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s ("NIHRC") 
advice since 2008,13 the current UK government has failed to 
implement this part of the 1998 peace agreement. Although the 
process began to stagnate under the Labour government in 2009, it 
was increasingly undermined by the Conservative/Liberal Coalition 
government in 2010. This was manifested most prominently in the 
establishment of a Commission in March 2011 to explore the 
possibility of a UK Bill of Rights and incorporating Northern Ireland 
into this process. The findings of the UK Commission’s report are 
examined in this section. We then draw upon our empirical findings 
by analyzing the responses of the political parties, and examining the 
role of the UK government in addressing the question of “what now” 
for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
The second half of the article discusses the disjointed approach 
by the two governments (despite being co-guarantors of the 1998 
Agreement) in addressing the issue of a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland. The UK government’s proposals to replace the Human Rights 
Act of 1998 with a UK Bill of Rights and Brexit are discussed, as is 
the issue of whether the consent of the devolved regions is required 
for the introduction of a UK Bill of Rights and Brexit. Given that 
some preliminary views for repealing the Human Rights Act were set 
out in "Changing Britain: Human Rights in the UK" in 2014,14 this 
document is used as a basis for our "what if" scenarios to help 
investigate the implications of the government’s proposals for 
Northern Ireland. The final section makes a series of 
recommendations for the way forward for a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights. 
                                                                                                             
11. Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, Gr. Brit.-Ir. Annex 3, ¶ 2, 
Apr. 2003, http://uir.ulster.ac.uk/31714/1/Final_Draft,_NILQ.pdf. 
12. Agreement at St Andrews 2006, Gr. Brit.-Ir., Annex B, Dec. 2006 (stating in part that 
“We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights and convene its inaugural meeting in December 
2006”). 
13. A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, N. IR. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.nihrc.org/uploads/pub 
lications/bill-of-rights-for-northern-ireland-advice-to-secretary-state-2008.pdf. 
14. See THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 2. 
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I. PARTICULAR CONTEXT OF NORTHERN IRELAND 
Northern Ireland’s political and legal history was dominated by 
half a century of one-party rule that allowed Unionists to exercise 
"hegemonic control in Northern Ireland,"15 to the detriment of the 
Nationalist/Catholic minority. During the period from 1922 to 1972, 
the minority suffered discrimination and inequality on grounds of 
religion and political belief at the hands of the majority in areas of 
public and private employment, housing, education and welfare, 
policing, and emergency law.16 However, the Northern Ireland 
conflict17 is not based on religion, but "rather one where religion acts 
principally as the marker for two distinct ethno national identities."18 
As McEvoy puts it, the conflict is about "two groups with allegiances 
to two different national communities, Britain and Ireland, which 
themselves have had a long history of conflict."19 Broadly speaking, 
one community (the Protestants) would identify themselves as British, 
preferring to stay within the United Kingdom, and are referred to as 
"Unionists"; the other community (the Catholics) generally identify 
themselves as Irish and are referred to as "Nationalists" or 
"Republicans."20 
                                                                                                             
15. BRENDAN O’LEARY & JOHN MCGARRY, THE POLITICS OF ANTAGONISM, 
UNDERSTANDING NORTHERN IRELAND 110 (1990).  
16. See Martin Melaugh, Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Cameron 
Commission Appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland, HER MAJESTY’S STATIONARY 
OFF. (1969), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/cameron.htm; DAVID J. SMITH & 
GERARG CHAMBER, INEQUALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1991); John Whyte, How Much 
Discrimination Was There Under the Unionist Regime, 1921-68?, in CONTEMPORARY IRISH 
STUDIES (Tom Gallagher & James O’Connell eds., 1983). See also MICHAEL FARRELL, THE 
ORANGE STATE (2D ED. 1980); KEVIN BOYLE, TOM HADDEN & PADDY HILLYARD, LAW AND 
STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND (1975).  
17. The Northern Ireland conflict is sometimes referred to as “The Troubles.” See, e.g., 
Jane Winter, Abuses and Activism: The Role of Human Rights in the Northern Ireland Conflict 
and  Peace Process, 1 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1-8 (2013). 
18. PAUL NOLAN, NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE MONITORING REPORT NUMBER ONE, 
COMMUNITY REL. COUNCIL 19 (Feb. 2012), http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/ 
nipmr_2012-02.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2016). 
19. JOANNE MCEVOY, THE POLITICS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 8 (2008). 
20. The Good Friday Agreement – An Overview, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INST. (June 
2013) http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/The-Good-Friday-
Agreement-An-Overview.pdf (last visited Apr. 29 2016). This report acknowledges, as do the 
authors of this article, that there are exceptions to this generalization.  See Turkey: 
Comparative Study Visit to the Republic of Ireland Conflict, DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INST. 
55-65 (2012), http://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/DPI-Ireland-
Comparative-Study-Visit-2012.pdf. 
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As is now well-documented, Northern Ireland also has a history 
of political violence by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries.21 This 
resulted in decades of sectarian violence with a "complex 
combination of a violent State reaction."22 During these decades of 
civil and sectarian unrest, the discourse of human rights played a 
prominent role with particular emphasis on the rule of law and 
ensuring the government and state authorities were held accountable 
for their "actions or inaction."23 This involved several, albeit 
unsuccessful, attempts to introduce a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland.24 Some commentators believe that if earlier proposals on a 
Bill of Rights had been passed by Northern Ireland’s Parliament, 
much of the later conflict could have been avoided.25 Arguably, 
"avoided" may be an overstatement, but had there been some form of 
accountability mechanism (such as a Bill of Rights) ensuring good 
governance and protecting everyone’s rights, the issue of 
discriminatory practices would not have risen in the way they did. 
In ethno-nationally divided societies such as Northern Ireland, 
Bills of Rights play an important role. As is now generally 
recognized, they "demarcate the power and discretion of the State";26 
when it comes to making decisions relating to fundamental rights, it is 
incumbent on elected politicians to do so in an equitable and fair 
manner. If they fail to make decisions fairly, a Bill of Rights can help 
                                                                                                             
21. For a brief chronological overview, see Martin Melaugh, Violence – Loyalist and 
Republican Paramilitary Groups, CAIN WEB SERVICE (last visited Apr. 29, 2016), 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/paramilitary.htm. 
22. Kieran McEvoy & John Morison, Constitutional and Institutional Dimensions 
Beyond the “Constitutional Moment”: Law, Transition and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland, 
26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 961, 970-95 (2003). 
23. Winter, supra note 17, at 7. 
24. Space constraints preclude a discussion on this issue. For a useful analysis, see 
Smith, et. al., supra note 6, at Chapter 2. 
25. MAURICE HAYES, MINORITY VERDICT: EXPERIENCE OF A CATHOLIC PUBLIC 
SERVANT 81 (1995). 
26. DAVID ERDOS, DELEGATING RIGHTS PROTECTION 3 (2010). Michele Lamb also 
highlights the importance of the language of human rights in ethno-nationalist divided 
societies in “providing the processual fairness needed to establish a dialogue that can lead 
towards greater understanding between the two communities [Protestants and Catholics].” 
Michele Lamb, Ethno-nationalist Conflict, Participation and Human Rights-based Solidarity 
in Northern Ireland, 17 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 723, 729 (2013). 
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the most vulnerable to hold their government to account.27 Placing 
fundamental values and rights beyond government is particularly 
important for post-conflict societies where parliamentary politics 
leading to discriminatory practices has failed. In divided societies like 
Northern Ireland where the governance of institutions created 
"divisions and provoked resentment and alienation,"28 a Bill of Rights 
is viewed as central to institutional reform.29 The break with the past, 
embodied in transitions from violent conflict and one-party rule, 
provides an opportunity to address issues not only of the rule of law 
and good governance but other structural issues such as violations and 
abuses against particular communities. It is in such a context that a 
Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland is most needed. Technical 
solutions will not be sufficient to address these challenges without a 
foundational document setting out the principles and standards that 
will command the allegiance of the people of Northern Ireland. A Bill 
of Rights can therefore provide a constitutional point of reference that 
becomes a legal framework for the politicians to act within. That is 
what was envisaged in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement of 1998.30 
                                                                                                             
27. Asmal saw this role as government “being kept on its toes.” See Kader Asmal, 
Address to Chatham House, London: Designing a Bill of Rights for a Diverse Society (Sept. 
26, 2007) (on file with authors). 
28. Brice Dickson, The Protection of Human Rights - Lessons from Northern Ireland, 3 
EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 213, 214 (2000). Dickson draws upon Northern Ireland’s experience 
of majoritarianism from 1921-1972, arguing that “it is the failure properly to protect human 
rights in Northern Ireland that made the troubles of the past 30 years worse or so worse than 
they might have been.” See also Aileen Kavanagh, The Role of a Bill of Rights in 
Reconstructing Northern Ireland, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 964, 956 (2004). Additionally, see 
Mageean and O’Brien’s article where they quote from O’Brien’s unpublished LLM thesis, 
which highlights that in an analysis of speeches of the Irish government to the General 
Assembly of the UN, every speech from 1969 until 1977, and from 1987 until 1991, the denial 
of rights was mentioned as a contributing factor to the conflict. Paul Mageean & Martin 
O’Brien, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Human Rights and the Good Friday 
Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1499, 1504 (1999). 
29. Monica McWilliams, Human Rights Underpins Devolution, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
27, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/apr/27/human-ri  
ghts-act-northern-ireland. 
30.  See Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10. Following the ceasefires in the 
mid-1990s multi-party peace talks began involving the British and Irish governments and the 
Northern Ireland political parties. This resulted in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which 
agreed on power-sharing arrangements for a new Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly. 
These power-sharing arrangements reflect the ethno-national division in Northern Ireland and 
have been described as having a “consociational” structure, involving institutionalized power 
sharing arrangements between segments of society joined together by common citizenship but 
divided by language, religion, ethnicity or other factors. See Brendan O’Leary, The Nature of 
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II. THE RECENT HISTORY OF A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR 
NORTHERN IRELAND: NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS AND 
DECLARATIONS 
Under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement31 and the Northern 
Ireland Act, s.69 (7) 1998 ("NIA"), the NIHRC was tasked with 
consulting and advising the British government on which rights 
should be included in a proposed Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement is an international peace 
agreement between two sovereign States (Ireland and Britain) that 
was signed and supported by the majority of Northern Ireland 
political parties involved in the conflict.32 In addition, the Agreement 
was overwhelmingly supported by a referendum in both Northern 
Ireland and in the Republic of Ireland.33 As a bilateral agreement, 
both the British and Irish government are its co-guarantors and, as an 
international agreement, they are required to fulfill the obligations it 
sets out through actions arising from it.34 These actions include the 
2003 Joint Declaration at Hillsborough, which reiterated the UK 
government’s commitment to bringing forward legislation on a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland at Westminster.35 This was followed by 
the St Andrews Agreement of 2006 establishing the Bill of Rights 
Forum made up of political parties and representatives from civil 
society. Following its deliberations, the Forum presented its report to 
the NIHRC36 and later that same year (December 10, 2008), the 
NIHRC submitted its advice on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
                                                                                                             
the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1628, 1628-1667 (1999). The term 
“consociationalism” was formulated by Lipjhart. See Lipjhart, supra note 9. 
31. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, at § 6 references the creation of the 
NIHRC and a Bill of Rights. 
32. The parties include Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP"), the Ulster Democratic Party 
("UDP"), the Progressive Unionist Party ("PUP"), the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, 
the Alliance Party, Sinn Féin, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"). The 
Democratic Unionist Party ("DUP") did not sign up to the Agreement. See The Good Friday 
Agreement – An Overview, supra note 20, at 34. 
33. Id. 71.2% of people in Northern Ireland and 94.39% in the Republic supported the 
Agreement.  
34. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3), opened for signature May 23, 
1969. 
35. Joint Declaration by the British and Irish Governments, Gr. Brit.-Ir., April 2003, 
Annex 3, ¶ 2. 
36. Final Report: Recommendations to the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission 
on a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, BILL OF RIGHTS F. (Mar. 31, 2008), available at 
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/law/bor/borf310308_report.pdf. 
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to the British government.37 The Commission put forward its 
recommendations for new substantive rights in addition to others 
relating to enforcement and implementation. The recommendations 
comprise a range of rights including economic, social, and cultural 
rights as well as civil and political rights, incorporating the ECHR and 
other international standards that reflect the particular circumstances 
of Northern Ireland.38 In 2009, the Northern Ireland Office ("NIO") 
responded to this advice by publishing its consultation document.39 
The NIO selected certain sections of the NIHRC’s advice for 
consultation and forwarded the view that further discussion on the 
NIHRC’s advice could take place through a newly established UK 
Commission on a possible UK-wide Bill of Rights. This Commission 
was established by the Coalition government in 2011 and published 
its report in December 2012.40 While the Commission could not reach 
                                                                                                             
37. See A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, supra note 13. 
38. The recommendations include: the right to life, right to liberty and security, right to a 
fair trial and no punishment without trial; right to marriage or civil partnership; right to 
equality and prohibition of discrimination; democratic rights; education rights; freedom of 
movement; freedom from violence, exploitation and harassment; right to identity and culture; 
language rights; rights of victims; right to civil and administrative justice; right to health; right 
to an adequate standard of living; right to accommodation; right to work; environmental rights; 
social security rights; and children’s rights. Not all commissioners agreed with these 
recommendations. Two commissioners (from unionist backgrounds) dissented: Lady Daphne 
Trimble and Jonathan Bell dissented on the grounds that the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights are not particular to Northern Ireland but “are by and large common societal problems 
right across the UK.” Lady Trimble, House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence Taken before 
the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland (July 1, 2009), 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmniaf/uc360-ii/uc36002.htm. 
Political parties are also divided on this issue. On the one hand, political unionists argue that 
the NIHRC exceeded its remit by including rights that do not reflect “the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland” – a phrase that “do[es] not open the door to economic, 
social and cultural rights.” Miss Mcllveen, Northern Ireland Assembly, Private Members’ 
Business on the NIHRC (Nov. 3, 2009), http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/ record/ 
hansard_session2009.htm (last visited May 2, 2016). On the other hand, the SDLP, Sinn Féin 
and Alliance Party, alongside NGOs, community groups, trade unions, and other civil society 
organisations, argue that socio-economic rights must be included, as they do reflect the 
“particular circumstances of Northern Ireland.” Smith et. al, supra note 6, at 32-33. 
39. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, N. IR. OFF. (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.nio.gov.uk/consultation_paper__a_bill_of_rights_for_northern_ireland__next_step
s.pdf 
40. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE 
US vol. 1 (Dec. 2012) 
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consensus on the need for a UK Bill of Rights,41 it did agree that it 
should reject the government’s proposal that a separate chapter in any 
future Bill could deal with the rights specific to Northern Ireland. In 
addition, the Commission specified that any UK Bill should not 
interfere with an independent process in Northern Ireland as it was a 
stand-alone issue, established under the peace agreement almost 
fifteen years prior.42 
The UK government had already concluded something similar. 
In its consultation document in 2009 the government argued that, 
given Northern Ireland’s history of division and conflict, there was a 
need for a separate Bill of Rights.43 Despite acknowledging the 
substantial differences amongst the Northern Ireland parties over its 
contents, it did not dispute the need for Northern Ireland to have its 
own Bill of Rights. It was not surprising then that this view was 
further supported by the findings of the UK Commission on a Bill of 
Rights as set out below.44  
We [the Commission] recognise the distinctive Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights process and its importance to the peace process in 
Northern Ireland. We do not wish to interfere in that process in 
any way nor for any of the conclusions that we reach to be 
interpreted or used in such a way as to interfere in, or delay, the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights process.45 
                                                                                                             
41. Two out of eight commissioners (Baroness Helena Kennedy QC and Professor 
Philippe Sands QC) dissented from the majority findings. See generally Mark Elliott, A Damp 
Squib in the Long Grass: The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, 2 EUR. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 137 (2013). For an excellent analysis of this report, see Francesca Klug & Amy 
Williams, The Choice Before Us? The Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, PUB. L. 
459 (July 2013). 
42. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40 at 175, ¶ 12.4. This is in stark 
contrast to the other findings in the report, a report that has been criticized as having 
“limit[ing], inchoate proposals.” Elliot, supra note 41. See also Klug & Williams, supra note 
41. 
43. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 39, at 7. 
44. See also dissenting opinions presented by Baroness Helena Kennedy QC and 
Professor Philip Sands: “It is impossible to speak of principle when the true purport is not 
being addressed explicitly and would include, for some at least, a reduction of rights. We 
consider that the moment is not ripe to start moving towards a UK Bill of Rights until the 
parameters of such proposals are clearly set out. We note in this regard that our colleagues in 
the majority have, in our view, failed to identify or declare any shortcomings in the Human 
Rights Act.” COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 222. 
45. COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 175, ¶ 12.4. 
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What is surprising is that despite such strong views from the 
Democratic Unionist Party ("DUP") who argue that a separate Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland would "distance Northern Ireland from 
the rest of the UK"46 and that a UK Bill of Rights would "recognise 
and respect the diversity of the devolved arrangements across the 
country,"47 neither the DUP (the largest party on the Unionist side in 
Northern Ireland) or the Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP") responded to 
the UK government’s invite to make a formal submission to the UK 
Commission on a Bill of Rights on this issue. 
The two main unionist parties’ stance is therefore at odds with 
the UK Bill of Rights Commission’s findings. Indeed one of the 
members of the UK Bill of Rights Commission specifically focused 
on Northern Ireland and endorsed different rights for the devolved 
regions in the UK.48 Speaight QC argued that there has been explicit 
and formal recognition of the desirability of a distinct Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights49 and cautioned that if there was to be a UK Bill 
of Rights, devolved legislatures should be able to legislate for specific 
rights within their jurisdictions.50 He continued: 
Consideration of future rights protection in the UK should take 
account of the reality that Northern Ireland [. . .] will have [its] 
own laws on rights and that these laws will not always match 
either each other or the laws at national level.51 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also discussed the idea of 
rights being "asymmetrical" at national and sub-national levels.52 The 
UK government has also recognized that there is "no 
incompatibility"53 with a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights and a 
                                                                                                             
46. DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT 
STEPS – RESPONSE BY DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST PARTY 1 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
47. Jeffrey Donaldson, Human Rights Act Has Failed Victims, DEMOCRATIC UNIONIST 
PARTY (May 12, 2015), http://www.mydup.com/news/article/donaldson-human-rights-act-has-
failed-victims. 
48. Anthony Speaight QC, Mechanisms of a UK Bill of Rights, in COMMISSION ON A 
BILL OF RIGHTS, A UK BILL OF RIGHTS? THE CHOICE BEFORE US vol. 1 (Dec. 2012) at 243. 
49  Id. See also COMMISSION ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 40. 
50. Speaight, supra note 48, at 247. 
51. Id. at 247-48. 
52. JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE UK? TWENTY-
NINTH REPORT OF THE 2007 – 2008 SESSION ¶ 110, cited in Anthony Speaight QC, supra note 
48, at 244-245. 
53. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 38. 
2016] BREXIT, REPEAL OF HRA & N. IRELAND BOR 91 
possible UK Bill of Rights.54 It continues to state that if a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights was introduced, any developments in the wider 
UK context should not "undermine"55 the rights provided in a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights, and committed to bringing forward 
legislation for a separate Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.56 This 
"commitment" was reiterated in the House of Lord’s debate that also 
restated the UK Bill of Rights Commission’s finding that the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is and should remain a separate 
process from the UK Bill of Rights.57 
The current government’s attempt to introduce a British Bill of 
Rights that will limit human rights to "serious" rather than "trivial"58 
cases could also be seen to contravene "the importance and 
significance of the Belfast Agreement in determining our way 
forward on human rights legislation."59 Despite this position, the 
former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has caused some 
confusion when she referred to the "Rights, Safeguards and Equality 
of Opportunity" section of the Agreement as having a "degree of 
ambiguity"60: 
Although the text does not go as far as stating that there would 
definitely be a Bill of Rights, the [A]greement certainly 
contemplated that a Bill of Rights was potentially an important 
part of the settlement.61 
The former Secretary of State’s argument that the "Rights, Safeguards 
and Equality of Opportunity" section of the Agreement had a "degree 
of ambiguity" was rebuffed by a number of stakeholders in Northern 
Ireland, including the former Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC, 
who is also a former member of the UN Human Rights Committee: 
                                                                                                             
54. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: DEVELOPING OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK LONDON, REPORT, (Mar. 2009) CM 7577. 
55. A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: NEXT STEPS, supra note 38. 
56.  Id.  
57. 24 Parl Deb HL (6th ser.) (2011) col. 677 (UK). 
58. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3. 
59. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Oral evidence to the 
Northern Ireland Affairs Committee on Responsibilities of the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, (Jul. 15, 2015) HC 322. 
60. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall 
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 194 (UK). 
61. See id. 
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. . . the language [of the Agreement] is such that you would be a 
very strange interpreter of the text not to recognise that there’s a 
responsibility [on]... the United Kingdom government, which is 
the sovereign (government) to work towards the consideration of 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights.62 
The centrality of the Bill of Rights to the peace process is also 
supported by the fact that the "Rights, Safeguards and Equality of 
Opportunity" section is only one among the many references to a 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights in the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement.63 Indeed, one politician states, "at the heart of the Good 
Friday Agreement is a rights-based approach."64 Northern Ireland’s 
Bill of Rights was therefore "not a last minute bolt-on in the 
agreement"; it was recognized by many parties as being "core to the 
agreement"65 and has been central to the UK government’s plans in 
                                                                                                             
62. Interview with Professor Michael O’Flaherty, former Chief Comm’r of the NIHRC, 
in Belfast (Sept. 11, 2013). 
63. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, Strand One, Democratic Institutions 
in Northern Ireland, Safeguards, at 5 (“There will be safeguards to ensure that all sections of 
the community can participate and work together successfully in the operation of these 
institutions and that all sections of the community are protected, including: . . . (b) the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland 
supplementing it, which neither the Assembly nor public bodies can infringe, together with a 
Human Rights Commission; (c) arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation are 
proofed to ensure that they do not infringe the ECHR and any Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland”); Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, Apr. 10 1998,  Operation of the Assembly, at 11  
(“The Assembly may appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a 
measure or proposal for legislation is in conformity with equality requirements, including the 
ECHR/Bill of Rights”); Legislation, at 26 (“The Assembly will have authority to pass primary 
legislation for Northern Ireland in devolved areas, subject to: (a) the ECHR and any Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland supplementing it which, if the courts found to be breached, would 
render the relevant legislation null and void.”). 
64. Alex Attwood MLA, 105(2) NIA Deb vol. 105, no. 2, p. 41 (June 1, 2015), available 
at http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-06-01.6.1#g6.79 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). 
Former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, described the Agreement 
as “conspicuous by the centrality it gives to equality and human rights concerns.” Mary 
Robinson, Speech at the Stormont Hotel: Equality and Human Rights - Their Role in Peace 
Building (Dec. 2, 1998), quoted in Mageean & O’Brien, supra note 28, at 1499. 
65. Stephen Farry, MLA, NIA Deb vol. 105, no. 2 (June 1, 2015), http://www.  
theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-06-01.6.1#g6.79 (last visited Mar. 10, 2016). Talking about 
the protection of human rights generally in the Agreement, Ní Aoláin makes a similar 
argument: human rights protections were not simply parachuted into the Agreement, but have 
consistently been offered as a partial means to unlock the conflict pattern itself. See Fionnuala 
Ní Aoláin, Human Rights in Negotiating Peace Agreements, INT’L COUNCIL HUM. RTS. POL’Y 
1 (2005). 
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any determination on their "way forward on human rights 
legislation."66 
Despite recognition that the responsibility lies with the UK 
government to pass legislation on Northern Ireland’s Bill of Rights, 
language used by the former Secretary of State is contrary on this 
point: 
Looking ahead, if there were agreement on additional rights for 
Northern Ireland, the Government would examine how best to 
take things forward. We remain open to the suggestion that work 
on this, including legislation, could be taken forward by the 
Assembly.67 
However, when a letter had been sent previously in September of 
2011 to each of the political parties in Northern Ireland proposing the 
Assembly be empowered to take forward work in this area,68 none of 
the parties expressed an interest in doing so. When asked to check this 
correspondence during interviews with all the main political parties, it 
became apparent that no one had responded to the NIO’s request. A 
number of parties expressed their concern at the proposal to devolve 
the discussions, noting that parties consistently exercise an effective 
veto in the Northern Ireland Assembly on issues perceived by either 
side to be contentious, preventing issues such as this from being taken 
forward.69 As the Alliance Party noted, "our system of government 
                                                                                                             
66.  For further information on “the notable for its extended references to human rights” 
in the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, see Colin Harvey, Bringing Humanity Home: A 
Transformational Human Rights Culture for Northern Ireland?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
TRANSITION: THE NORTHERN IRELAND CONTEXT 49-50 (Clare Dwyer & Anne-Marie 
McAlinden eds., 2015) [hereinafter Bringing Humanity Home].  
67. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall 
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 194 (UK). 
68. Letter from Owen Patterson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (2010 – 2012), 
to the leaders of the Northern Ireland Political Parties, received by the Northern Ireland 
Assembly, (Sept. 22, 2011) (on file with authors).  
69. See NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY REPORT, OFFICIAL REPORT (2001-02), (2001), 
http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports/010925d.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). For 
example, the petition of concern was used to block the introduction of the Welfare Reform Bill 
in May 2015. See Welfare Reform: SDLP ‘Cannot Accommodate’ Welfare Proposals, BBC 
NEWS (May 22, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-32853348. A petition of 
concern has been described by the Northern Ireland Assembly as: “a notice signed by at least 
30 members and presented to the Speaker signifying concern about any forthcoming matter on 
which the Assembly is due to vote. The effects of a petition of concern are (a) that the vote on 
the matter may not be held until at least the day after the petition has been presented and (b) 
the vote will be on a cross-community basis, rather than simple majority.” PLENARY TERMS, 
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provides vetoes for the largest parties on either side of the divide and 
it’s always easier to veto change than to veto no change."70 
Respondents also focused on the absence of consensus amongst 
the two main parties in government on having this issue devolved to 
the Northern Ireland Assembly. Similar to the leader of the Alliance 
Party who argues "unless the largest party was in favour it could still 
be blocked . . . decisions are those that are worked out by the DUP 
and Sinn Féin at Executive level,"71 the Green Party also believes 
"there is the politically sensitive stuff . . . that goes into the Office for 
First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMdFM) and doesn’t 
                                                                                                             
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (2016), http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/plenary/terms.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 10 2016). This was tabled in respect of a motion questioning whether the 
NIHRC had gone beyond its remit under the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement regarding the 
development of a Bill of Rights in the context of the development of a Bill of Rights. On  
October 1, 2001, the following amendment was put forward: “[the NIHRC] has been hindered 
in discharging its remit due to limits on its powers and resources but congratulates the 
Commission on its substantial contributions to the debate on and in developing human rights in 
Northern Ireland.” The Assembly was divided with the Nationalist parties voting yes (48) and 
the Unionists parties voting no (39). See PETITION OF CONCERN: NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMMISSION, NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (2016), http://archive. 
niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports/011001e.htm#8 (last visited Apr. 12 2016). On April 8, 
2008, a motion was put forward and supported by the majority that showed concern at the lack 
of cross-community support for Bill of Rights Forum report. See PRIVATE MEMBERS’ 
BUSINESS:  BILL OF RIGHTS AND NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Apr. 8, 2008), http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/
reports2007/080408.htm#4 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). See also NORTHERN IRELAND 
ASSEMBLY REPORT, OFFICIAL REPORT (2009-10): MEMBERS’ BUSINESS ON THE NIHRC, 
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Nov. 3, 2009). Another petition of concern was tabled on 
November 2, 2009 on the following motion proposed by the Unionist party: “That this 
Assembly considers the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice to the Secretary 
of State ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland’ incompatible with the provisions of the Belfast 
Agreement; notes with concern that the proposals would undermine the democratic role and 
authority of this Assembly and the Parliament of the United Kingdom; and urges the Secretary 
of State not to implement the report’s recommendations.” The following amendment was then 
proposed to the motion: “notes the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s advice to 
the Secretary of State, ‘A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland,’ and calls on the Secretary of 
State to publish the consultation document as soon as possible.” The Assembly was divided as 
46 voted yes; 39 voted no. See PRIVATE MEMBERS’ BUSINESS: NORTHERN IRELAND HUMAN 
RIGHTS COMMISSION, NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY (Nov. 3, 2009) http://  
archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2009/091103.htm#a5 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
70. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Nov. 25, 2013) (on file 
with authors). There is also a basic point: the Bill of Rights should bind the Assembly. This 
can be done by Westminster legislation but it is very difficult to see how this can be done 
neatly by Assembly legislation. Thanks to Rory O’Connell for bringing this point to the 
authors’ attention. 
71. Id. 
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come out."72 An example of this prevarication is the disagreement 
over the introduction of a Single Equality Bill despite the introduction 
of the Equality Act of 2010 for Great Britain, which has meant that 
Northern Ireland is "out of step with the rest of the UK in terms of 
equality protections."73 
Labour MP Ivan Lewis, a former Shadow Spokesperson on 
Northern Ireland, noted that although devolution requires that the 
Executive take the lead: 
. . . there has been no progress historically, in the peace process 
at very difficult stages without the active engagement of the two 
governments very much working together as one.74 
This view holds much merit, since it is unlikely that the proposals 
from the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement on policing and criminal 
justice reform would have been taken forward by the devolved 
Assembly. Given the lack of political consensus on these reforms, it is 
incumbent for the UK government to take the legislation through 
Westminster.75 
For the UK government to argue that a process should be 
established at the devolved level to resolve party political differences 
over the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland is extremely problematic. 
This is exemplified by the process established by the First and Deputy 
First Ministers in July 2013 to resolve issues of cultural expression, 
including parades and protests, flags, symbols and emblems, and the 
legacy of the past.76 An all-party group was established and 
independently facilitated by US diplomat Richard Haass and Megan 
                                                                                                             
72. Interview with Steven Agnew, MLA, Green Party, in Belfast (May 2, 2013) (on file 
with authors). 
73. Motion put forward by the Alliance Party on a call for a fresh consultation on a 
Single Equality Bill for Northern Ireland, Official Report 16 March 2015, available at 
http://aims.niassembly.gov.uk/officialreport/report.aspx?&eveDate=2015/03/16&docID=2280
45 (last visited May 2, 2016). 
74. Interview with Ivan Lewis, former Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 
speaking on ‘The View’ BBC, in London, U.K. (May 8, 2014), quoted in Smith, McWilliams 
& Yarnell, supra note 6, at 45. 
75. Westminster passed The Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. (Gr. Brit.). 
76. The formal negotiations are formally known as The Panel of Parties in the Northern 
Ireland Executive on Parades and Protests; Flags, Symbols, Emblems and Related Matters; 
and the Past, Terms of Reference (2013), available at http://panelofpartiesnie.com/terms/ (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
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O’Sullivan.77 The Haass-O’Sullivan negotiations took place between 
the political parties from July to December of 2013 with stakeholders 
from civil society participating in parallel discussions. The Bill of 
Rights was not in the terms of reference for the Haass-O’Sullivan 
talks, but they were asked to consider related matters that opened the 
space for other issues to be discussed. The NIHRC and a number of 
groups involved in the Bill of Rights process met with the facilitators 
while others submitted papers. They took the view that a human 
rights-based framework was needed to help resolve the problematic 
issues of cultural expression.78 Some non-governmental organizations 
("NGOs") argued that the Haass-O’Sullivan process was not, 
however, the appropriate place for discussions on the substantive 
issue of a Bill of Rights, fearing a "watering down" of the 
international standards as politicians bargained over human rights.79 
Sinn Féin referenced the issue of the delay on progressing the 
proposal in the peace agreement in its submission: "[t]he British 
Government has still not introduced a Bill of rights. This void has 
contributed in no small measure to the malaise we are currently in, 
surrounding these issues."80 The Alliance Party MP stated that 
although the issue of the Bill of Rights was important, introducing it 
in "the context of trying to resolve one of those issues (parades) 
would overburden the process."81 
The Haass-O’Sullivan talks concluded without agreement on 
December 31, 2013. The final report made a number of 
recommendations, such as the establishment of a Commission on 
Identity and Culture to consider, amongst other issues, a Bill of 
                                                                                                             
77. The appointment of M. O’Sullivan and R. Haass by the five parties of the Executive 
is stated in the Panel’s Mission Statement, available at http://panelofpartiesnie.com/mission/ 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2016).  
78. Together: Building a United Community Strategy and the Multi-Party Group on 
Flags, Parades and Dealing with the Past, COMM. ADMIN. JUSTICE (Aug. 2013) (detailing the 
briefing from the Committee on the Administration of Justice.)  
79. Interview with Nicole Brown, Practice and Participation of Rights, in Belfast (Jan. 
24, 2014). 
80. Submission on Flags, Symbols and Emblems, SINN FÉIN (Oct. 15, 2013). 
81. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013). While 
noting the need for a dedicated discussion on human rights, the same individual argued that 
these discussions might enable the Unionist community to deliver on the need for a wider 
framework in which these rights would be placed: “If they were all in the same pool of issues 
would it give people flexibility to do some trade around that politically, to be able to deliver on 
them?”  
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Rights for Northern Ireland.82 Both Sinn Féin83 and the Alliance Party 
voiced concerns that placing the Bill of Rights into such a 
Commission would mean that there would be far less focus on it since 
the process was designed to find a resolution to flags and parades.84 
The Irish government did not dismiss its inclusion, believing that it 
could be a way to revive the debate but should not preclude other 
routes to progress.85 The UK government diverged from the more 
usual joint approach with the Irish government,86 with the former 
Secretary of State adopting the view that the talks provided the basis 
for continuing discussions between the parties.87 The failure of the 
Haass-O’Sullivan process reflected at that time a larger failing of the 
Northern Irish political parties to independently resolve contentious 
issues without the active engagement of the two governments 
working together as one. 
It remains the case that the British government has failed in their 
commitment to bring forward in "Westminster legislation, rights 
supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland"88 
which is affirmed in the findings of our report where several 
politicians and stakeholders emphasized that the UK government bear 
the key responsibility: 
It is the duty of [the UK] Government as a co-guarantor of the 
[A]greement and as a signatory to it to engage proactively with 
all stakeholders, including political parties, to seek consensus on 
this [Bill of Rights] and other outstanding issues. There is a 
                                                                                                             
82. Proposed Agreement Dec. 13, 2013: An Agreement Among the Parties of the 
Northern Ireland Executive on Parades, Select Commemorations, and Related Protests; Flags 
and Emblems; and Contending with the Past 17. The Commission would consist of fifteen 
members, eight elected representatives to be appointed by the five leaders of the Executive 
parties and the other seven members to be outside government. 
83. Gerry Adams TD, Sinn Féin, speaking at Ard Chomhairle TV Press Conference, 
(Jan. 11, 2014), available at http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/28417 (last visited May 2, 2016). 
84. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Feb. 13, 2014). 
85. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014). 
86. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, speaking in the Dáil (Jan. 15, 2014), available at 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2014
011500005?opendocument (last visited Apr.12, 2016).  
87. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall 
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 197 (UK) 
88. See Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, in The Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement, supra note 10, at ¶ 4, 16-17.  
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particular responsibility around leadership on such issues when 
they are reserved matters.89 
The responsibility sits with the UK government. [ . . . ] [W]hat is 
crucially missing is an indication from the British government 
that their intention is to legislate for something worthy of the 
name of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights.90 
This idea of putting pressure on the UK government as a "guarantor" 
was reiterated by various respondents: "[t]here is a co-guarantor duty 
on the Irish government to keep pressure on them [British 
government] as well."91 One political representative went further to 
state that in "our view the Irish government has failed in its 
responsibilities to press the British."92 Commenting on both the 
British and Irish governments’ role, the Progressive Unionist 
representative stated: 
It’s both the British and Irish [governments] that have allowed 
the Northern Irish parties to decide what the Good Friday 
Agreement looks like; and that’s been the difficulty. Rather than 
saying, ‘no, no, no, this needs to be discussed, (as) this was said 
in the Good Friday Agreement’ they’re so happy that the thing 
[Bill of Rights] has run for so long…. sometimes it is difficult to 
ascertain the difference between the British and Irish 
governments now, they seem to have a joint voice on this.93 
Some interviewees also believed that the Irish government "has not 
been particularly engaged" on the Bill of Rights issue, arguing that it 
could be playing a more "vigorous" role94: 
The Irish government could be saying more forthrightly that this 
is an issue that is still here. It is not going to disappear, it’s a 
commitment under the Good Friday Agreement and it needs to be 
addressed and that the Irish government is willing to assist in that 
process. [ . . . ] Its job is as a guarantor and it can’t do very much 
on its own but it can put significant pressure on the British 
                                                                                                             
89. Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, at the Westminster Hall (July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl 
Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 191 (UK). 
90. Interview with Patrick Corrigan, Amnesty UK, in Belfast (Nov. 6, 2013). 
91. Interview with Kevin Hanratty, Human Rights Consortium, in Belfast (Oct. 31, 
2013). 
92. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to the Deputy First Minister, Sinn 
Féin, in Belfast (June 7, 2013). 
93. Interview with Billy Hutchinson, PUP, in Belfast (Sept. 11, 2013). 
94. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013). 
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government and it can also put some pressure on the parties 
locally.95 
The Irish government rejects this view, recognizing that they are "co-
guarantors of the peace agreement"96 and have an obligation to work 
towards the implementation of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. 
As the former Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, stated: 
Regarding the Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, I reiterate the 
commitment of the Government to ensure the full and effective 
implementation of all aspect of the Good Friday Agreement and 
the St Andrews Agreement. In that context, we attach importance 
to a specific Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as envisaged in 
the Good Friday Agreement. The Government has consistently 
communicated that position in contacts with the current British 
Administration and with the Conservative Party Front Bench.97 
The former Tánaiste, Eamon Gilmore, raised the Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights in several speeches referring to the need to 
fulfill all parts of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement:  
We need to realise in full the potential of the Agreement and all 
its parts including a bill of rights. We cannot be selectively blind 
to those parts we find difficult. When we pick and choose the 
balance and integrity of the whole is picked apart.98 
We need to reflect honestly on where there have been gaps left or 
intentions and commitments left unfulfilled... This is why 
commitments such as the Bill of Rights ... are not optional extras. 
They are fundamental. We neglect it at our cost.99 
Interviewees recognized that the Irish government is in a different 
position than the UK government since the legislative process for any 
                                                                                                             
95. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013). 
96. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014). 
97. See Ceisteanna: Questions, Northern Ireland Issues, 692(3) DÁIL ÉIREANN DEBATE 
562 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/ debates%20authoring/ 
debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2009102100004?opendocument (last visited May 1, 2016).  
Fianna Fáil was in government in 2009. In 2009, the British Labour party was in government. 
In 2011, the Irish government became a coalition between Fine Gael and the Labour Party. 
98. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, Address to the SDLP Conference Conference 
(Nov. 9, 2013),  https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/browsebyyear/2013/4/. The former 
Tánaiste also raised the Bill of Rights in his speech to the Alliance Party’s Annual Conference 
in April 2012. 
99. Eamon Gilmore, Former Tánaiste, Address to the British-Irish Association (Sept. 7, 
2013), https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/tags/browsebyyear/2013/4/. 
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Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland will be in the Westminster 
Parliament. An official from the Irish government noted that they 
could be “more facilitative, give encouragement to look deeper at the 
issues."100 As some politicians noted, “if the Irish government go [sic] 
too far it will create Unionist antagonism"101 and “would get up the 
backs of the DUP.”102 This is exactly what happened when the Irish 
Prime Minister, Enda Kenny, commented in January 2016 that there 
would be “serious difficulties"103 for Northern Ireland if the United 
Kingdom left the European Union following the Brexit referendum in 
June 2016. Reacting to this comment, the DUP leader and the First 
Minister for Northern Ireland, Arlene Foster, stated, ‘“[i]t is for the 
people of the UK to decide what’s the best way forward and, as you 
know, we don’t take too kindly to people telling us what to do.”104 
However, as noted below, the Irish government needed to articulate 
its serious concerns on the implications of Northern Ireland being 
encouraged to withdraw from the European Union. 
For several years, the lack of either government taking a lead on 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland has led to a stalemate. In 
attempting to tackle this stalemate, the Alliance Party obtained a 
formal debate on a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights at Westminster 
Hall in 2013. The Alliance Party MP reminded the Secretary of State 
that “it is the duty of Government as a co-guarantor of the agreement, 
and as a signatory to it, to engage proactively with all stakeholders, 
including political parties, to seek consensus on this and other 
outstanding issues.”105 In responding to the Westminster debate, the 
Secretary of State noted that “the Government would like to see this 
issue resolved . . . but we cannot simply conjure consensus into 
existence.” 106  
                                                                                                             
100. Interview, off-the-record (Feb. 19, 2014). 
101. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013). 
102. Interview with Anna Lo, MLA, Alliance Party, in Belfast (May 2, 2013). 
        103. Brexit Would Create Serious Difficulties for NI Says Enda Kenny, BBC NEWS (Jan. 
25, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-35395135.  
        104. Brexit: Arlene Foster Says Enda Kenny Has Right to Express Opinion, BBC News 
(Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-35407313 (last visited Apr. 
12, 2016). 
105. July 16, 2013, Parl Deb HC (2013) col. 190 WH (UK), http://www.  
publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm130716/halltext/130716h0001.htm#130
71670000077 (Naomi Long, MP). 
106. Theresa Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall 
(July 16, 2013) in 16 Parl Deb WH (6th ser.) (2013) col. 197 (UK). 
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 The findings of our report show that when asked to respond to 
this, those parties in favor of a Bill of Rights expressed their 
dissatisfaction, arguing that unless pressure is applied from 
Westminster and parties are “incentivized,”107 then a process will not 
get started: 
At the moment the government are taking what they claim is a 
neutral position. But, by taking a neutral position, they are 
effectively not progressing and therefore are on the side of no 
movement.108 
The parties, in favor of progressing a Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland, also noted that the proposals in the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement had been endorsed by a Northern Ireland referendum and 
the outcome in favor of the peace agreement (including the proposal 
for a Bill of Rights) still stands. The parties believed that they were 
being left to be persuaders with the UK government having adopted a 
position that “those who are in favour of a Bill of Rights . . . should 
focus their efforts on persuading those in Northern Ireland who 
remain skeptical [sic] on building such a consensus.”109 However, 
these parties argue that it should not be their responsibility to 
persuade others of the need for a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, 
as this responsibility lies with the government.110 This concern was 
further highlighted in 2014 in a Westminster debate on a Northern 
Ireland Bill, where the SDLP took the opportunity to criticize the 
government’s current position of inaction on the Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights. Margaret Ritchie MP noted: 
There are rights that are peculiar to Northern Ireland, which has a 
particular political situation that needs to be recognised. I regret 
the fact that the Government did not see fit to introduce a Bill of 
Rights that could have run concurrently with this Bill through 
both Houses. I ask the Minister to reflect on that . . . to talk to his 
                                                                                                             
107. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party of N. Ir., in Belfast (Nov. 25, 
2013). 
108. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, of N. Ir., in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013). 
109. Letter from Mike Penning, former Minister of State for Northern Ireland to the 
authors (May 24, 2013), in response to a letter from the authors to Theresa Villiers, former 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Mar. 26, 2013) (on file with authors). 
110. This was the position stated by all interviewees from parties in favor of the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. Interviews with the Alliance Party (Nov. 25, 2013; Sinn Féin, 
June 7, 2013; and the SDLP, May 1, 2013).   
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colleagues in government, and to ensure that such legislation is 
introduced.111 
However, the then-Minister of State for Northern Ireland did not 
appear to be familiar with the proposal for a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights as demonstrated by his response: 
We have the Human Rights Act 1998 in place, and if all parties 
in Northern Ireland wish to propose some special legislation at 
the Westminster Parliament, we would of course consider it, but I 
see no need for such a thing, and I have never heard anybody 
suggest there was a need before.112 
This explicit acknowledgement shows a fundamental lack of 
understanding within the Conservative government about a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights. Had the former Minister of State for Northern 
Ireland read the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, “he would 
understand that it contains an entire page and chapter dedicated to 
human rights . . . and] that the agreement contains a specific 
obligation about a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland.”113 
Several other political representatives have also expressed their 
concern at the UK government’s “rollback.”114 Another former 
political spokesperson went so far as to state that “we’re in a worse 
position than we were when we started.”115 The spokesperson 
continued to state that as far as the British government is concerned: 
. . . we have held the consultations, we have held the community 
forums, we have held the intense political discussions. We’re 
now at the position where there was only one decision to make 
and that was whether to implement it [the NIHRC’s advice] or 
                                                                                                             
111. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 370 (UK) (Margaret Ritchie, MP, SDLP).  
112. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col. 376 (UK) Andrew Robathan, former 
Minister of State for Northern Ireland (October 2013 – July 2014). 
113. Mar. 12, 2014, Parl Deb HC (2014) col 376 (UK) (Lady Sylvia Hermon, MP, 
Independent MP for North Down). In response to the former NIO Minister’s admission in this 
debate that he had not read the Agreement since 1998, the MP for North Down also added, “It 
would be wise, after 16 years for the Minister, before coming back to speak on an important 
piece of Northern Ireland legislation, to read the Good Friday agreement, the Belfast 
Agreement, in detail.” 
114. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, Socialist Democratic and Labour Party, in 
Belfast (May 1, 2013). 
115. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin, 
in Belfast (June 7, 2013). 
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not to implement it - and that is even implementing it in a slightly 
different format than what’s been proposed.116 
The leader of the UUP acknowledged that “the main political parties 
together haven’t sat down and engaged on it”117 and admitted that: 
Would we vote in favour tomorrow for a Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights? The answer would be no, because we don’t see the 
argument and the need. But if you come to me and say – have 
you thought of this and this, and you can persuade us then we 
would come around to it.118 
The leader of the UUP added, “I think that there would be merit in 
looking at a Bill of Rights because it’s a commitment that’s sat in the 
Belfast Agreement and fifteen years on, clearly no one has really 
seriously engaged.”119 Likewise, the DUP spokesperson also noted, 
“we are open to any discussions that are going on and any proposals 
that are being brought forward.”120 Sinn Féin believed that what was 
needed was a little bit of “hard-talk . . . the government (needs to) 
have a plan or a structure because otherwise . . . we are back in the 
same place. We’d just be updating positions.”121 Sinn Féin added a 
proviso that “we have to find something different”122 but what the 
“something different” might look like was not elaborated on. The 
leader of the Alliance Party also believed that an alternative approach 
was needed and opined that “a facilitation process, speaking to the 
parties and then putting forward proposals is the only real prospect we 
have.”123 The Alliance Party MP took the view that "getting parties 
around the table is a starting point . . . but that process needs to be 
very focused and time-limited.”124 The Sinn Féin party leader also 
noted the need for greater focus: “issues such as a Bill of Rights . . . 
                                                                                                             
116. Id. 
117. Interview with Mike Nesbitt, MLA, UUP, in Belfast (June 7, 2013). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Jonathan Bell, Junior Minister. Interview with Jonathan Bell, MLA, Democratic 
Unionist Party, and Emma Little, DUP, MLA, Democratic Unionist Party, in Belfast (May 21, 
2013). 
121. Interview with Vincent Parker, Special Adviser to Deputy First Minister, Sinn Féin, 
in Belfast (June 7, 2013). 
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123. Interview with David Ford, MLA, Alliance Party, of N. Ir. in Belfast (Nov. 25, 
2013). 
124. Interview with Naomi Long, MP, Alliance Party, of N. Ir., in Belfast (Oct. 2, 2013). 
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are not going away”125 and remain to be resolved in the near future. 
The findings of our report therefore show that all parties are willing to 
engage in this issue and seek “something different.” Even the failure 
of the recent political talks/agreements such as the Haass-O’Sullivan 
talks (July-December 2013),126 the Stormont House Agreement 
(December 2014),127 and the Fresh Start Agreement (November 
2015)128 highlights the pressing need to provide an alternative 
approach. 
III. ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT STALEMATE 
As the co-guarantors of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, we 
argue that the British and Irish governments need to establish a 
coherent approach to a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland by 
developing a joint policy framework. The framework should clarify 
how the governments see their respective roles in implementing their 
obligations under the Belfast/Good Friday and St Andrews 
Agreements and agree how best to take forward the work on a Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland. The importance of moving forward on a 
Bill of Rights is particularly important in divided societies emerging 
from decades of violent political conflict. As noted earlier, Bills of 
Rights “are traditional and well used constitutional mechanisms”129 in 
“conflicted/transitional” societies130 as they act as a bridge in helping 
countries transition from conflict to move forward from “a 
                                                                                                             
125. Gerry Adams, TD, Presidential Address to Sinn Féin at ArdFheis 2014, (Feb. 8, 
2014), http://www.sinnfein.ie/ga/contents/28950 (last visited May 2, 2016). 
126. The Haass-O’Sulivan final report made a number of recommendations, one of 
which was that a Commission on Identity and Culture be set up to consider amongst other 
issues a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. See THE HAASS-O’SULLIVAN FINAL REPORT, 
(July-Dec., 2013) (on file with authors). 
127. THE STORMONT HOUSE AGREEMENT (Dec. 2014), https://www.gov.uk/ 
government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390672/Stormont_House_Agreemen
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128. A FRESH START: THE STORMONT AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (Nov. 
17, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 
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129. Harvey, supra note 66, at 56-57. 
130. Christine Bell, Colin Campbell & Fionnuala Ní Aoláin et. al., Justice Discourses in 
Transition 13:3 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 305, 310 (2004).  
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contentious past as well as being a point of reference for future 
generations.”131 While their effectiveness “is highly context 
dependent,”132 Bills of Rights have been “convenient device[s]”133 for 
countries coming out of conflict. 
The two governments need to adopt a consistent approach to the 
implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. While the 
Irish government regards a separate Bill of Rights for Northern 
Ireland as an integral part of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement,134 
the British government believes that a UK Bill of Rights could serve 
all devolved regions, including Northern Ireland.135 Clarification is 
therefore necessary to reconcile the current differences in both 
governments’ approach to this issue. 
IV. THE "WHAT IF" SCENARIOS 
The UK government’s plan for the replacement of the Human 
Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights remains unclear as the 
proposals have yet to be published. While we know the results of the 
Brexit referendum,136 there are several variables post-Brexit, such as 
the fundamental issue about the future protection of EU-related rights 
                                                                                                             
131. Northern Ireland Human Rights Comm’r, supra note 13, at 3. 
132. Harvey, supra note 66, at 56-57. 
133. Id. 
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23, 2016. England and Wales voted to leave (53.4% and 52.5% respectively), Scotland and 
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results. 
106 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
in Northern Ireland, to be considered.137 What will happen now with 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?138 This Charter is stronger 
than the ECHR as it includes a broader range of rights (notably 
economic, social, and cultural rights in addition to civil and political 
rights), as well as freedom of movement for EU citizens within the 
European Union and data protection. 
However, it is important to acknowledge that the Charter does 
have several limitations, such as its scope being restricted to EU 
laws.139 Further, the Charter and its enforcement body, the European 
Court of Justice, make a distinction between "rights" and 
"principles."140 This means that although a "right" exists in language, 
it does not mean that it will be directly enforceable. Most of the socio-
economic rights are "principles."141 The most notable example is the 
Court of Justice’s interpretation of Article 27 of the Charter in the 
AMS case, where the Court concluded that Article 27 was not a 
right.142 This case highlights that while on its face the Charter 
recognizes the indivisibility of rights, socio-economic rights are not 
accorded equal weight with civil and political rights.143 Another 
                                                                                                             
137. Brexit raises a myriad of legal, political, economic, and constitutional issues. It is 
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143. For an excellent discussion about the role and nature of the EU Charter post-Brexit, 
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important question concerns whether Northern Ireland and the United 
Kingdom will be bereft of specific legislation if they no longer have 
to implement EU directives. Northern Ireland has benefitted in 
particular from a range of EU equality legislation (such as the Race 
Equality Directive and the Employment Equality Directive). As one 
human rights lawyer puts it, "Brexit and a possible decoupling of 
domestic law from the underlying Directives that have given rise to 
these rights would cause these to probably fluctuate."144 
Repealing the Human Rights Act also raises a series of 
fundamental questions, such as whether replacing the Human Rights 
Act with a UK Bill of Rights would be a "grievous breach of the 
Good Friday Agreement."145 If the UK government did this, what 
could or would the Irish government do? Does it mean that Northern 
Ireland would not have its own specific Bill of Rights? Or does it 
present an opportunity for a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights? Does the 
British government require the consent of the devolved assemblies, 
including the Northern Ireland Assembly, to proceed with both its 
proposals to repeal the Human Rights Act and Brexit? In an attempt 
to respond to the questions above, we provide a series of "what if" 
scenarios. Before doing so, some background information on the 
government’s plans on repealing the Human Rights Act is provided. 
V. CONSERVATIVE’S PROPOSALS TO REPEAL THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT 
Over the past six years, the Conservative party has repeated its 
intention to "scrap the Human Rights Act altogether."146 Its plans 
                                                                                                             
144. Id. at 7. Brexit also raises the question about “acquired rights” in EU law. 
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146. See Theresa May, Speech at the Conservative Party Conference (Oct. 2012), 
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detail, dating back to as early as 2006, David Cameron (as Opposition Leader at that time) 
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were elaborated in the 2014 publication of a strategy paper, 
"Protecting Human Rights in the UK."147 This document sets out the 
Conservative’s plans to introduce "a new British Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities"148 with nine "key objectives."149 As these objectives 
have been examined elsewhere, we focus here on the points relevant 
to our discussion.150 Generally, the Conservative’s proposals are to 
"repeal Labour’s Human Rights Act."151 To this end, the 
Conservatives propose to introduce a "British Bill of Rights and 
Responsibilities" that will limit the scope of human rights laws to "the 
most serious cases" and restrict the reach of the cases to the UK. The 
proposals also refer to rendering Strasbourg judgments as "advisory" 
and "break[ing] the formal link between British courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights,"152 with the British courts no 
longer being required to take into account Strasbourg rulings.153 If the 
Council of Europe does not agree with these proposals, the 
Conservatives' only alternative for the United Kingdom is to 
withdrawal from the ECHR.154 
As the UK government does not intend to add new rights in the 
proposed British Bill of Rights,155 the key issue is how any rights 
should be adjudicated. In other words, it is more to do with breaking 
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2016] BREXIT, REPEAL OF HRA & N. IRELAND BOR 109 
the formal link between British courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights. This point is explicitly made in the Conservative’s 
2015 manifesto: 
The next Conservative Government will scrap the Human Rights 
Act, and introduce a British Bill of Rights. This will break the 
formal link between British courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights, and make our own Supreme Court the ultimate 
arbiter of human rights matters in the UK.156 
However, in the Queen’s speech in May 2016, there is a reference 
only to "proposals,"157 and not a Bill for a British Bill of Rights.158 
There has therefore been a hiatus in bringing forward such a Bill and, 
despite several appearances of the then-Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for Justice and the then-Minister of Justice before various 
select committees in 2015 and 2016 and ministerial statements on this 
issue,159 the public has been left "baffled and a bit in the dark."160 
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Harman), asking about proposed timings, see Joint Committee on Human Rights, Letter to the 
Justice Secretary about the Bill of Rights (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.equalityhumanrights 
.com/en/file/17111/download?token=bi-FE9rU (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). Michael Gove (the 
former Minister of Justice and former Attorney General) was non-committal, stating only that 
the government consultation would be a “thorough, transparent and productive exercise with a 
wide stakeholder group.” See Justice Secretary’s Response to Joint Committee on Human 
Right’s letter about the Bill of Rights (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/  
joint-committees/human-rights/Michael_Gove_Letter_Bill_of_Rights_271115.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2016). In December 2015, according to the former Attorney General, a consultation 
document was “being shared” with government colleagues. It would then go to the relevant 
committees and then a consultation would begin sometime in the “new year.” See House of 
Lords, The Select Committee on the Constitution, Oral Evidence Session with the Right 
Honourable Michael Gove MP, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Evidence 
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One of the main reasons for the delay of such a Bill is the 
complicated issue of devolution and, as far as Northern Ireland is 
concerned, the impact of the government’s proposals for the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement. As discussed earlier, the Agreement is 
replete with references to human rights, not least the requirement on 
the British government to "complete incorporation"161 into Northern 
                                                                                                             
Session No. 1 Heard in Public, Questions 1 – 12 (Dec. 2, 2015), http://data.parliament.uk/  
writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/constitution-committee/lord-
chancellor/oral/28327.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). When questioned again about this in an 
appearance before the House of Lords EU Justice Sub-committee in February 2016, the former 
Attorney General’s initial response was that the consultation paper would be announced 
“soon,” but after further probing from the Committee, he stated that he was “at the mercy of 
the Prime Minister,” and while not committing to a date, remained “confident” that “there will 
not be too long to wait.” See House of Lords, Revised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before 
The Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential 
Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Heard in 
Public, Questions 79 – 90 (Feb. 2, 2016). Witnesses: Rt Hon Mr Michael Gove MP and Mr 
Dominic Raab MP, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/  
evidencedocument/eu-justice-subcommittee/potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rights-
act-on-eu-law/oral/28347.html (last visited May 2, 2016). The Final report was published in 
May 2016, House of Lords, European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill of 
Rights 12th Report of Session 2015-2016 (May 2016), http://www.publications.  
parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf (last visited June 7, 2016). On April 
26, 2016, Dominic Raab’s vague response provides no further light on this issue as he talked 
about proposals being published “in due course.” See Oral Answers To Questions on a British 
Bill of Rights, 26 April 2016, Parl Deb HC (2016) col. 608, 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2016-04-26/debates/16042636000018/BritishBill  
OfRights (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). On May 17, 2016, Michael Gove sent a letter in reply 
from the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on the Bill of Rights giving very little 
away by merely stating that his ministerial team would be happy to discuss the government’s 
proposals further without indicating when that will take place. See Former Justice Secretary’s 
Response to Joint Committee on Human Right’s Letter about the Bill of Rights (May 17, 
2016) http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/correspondence/  
160517_Letter_MG_to_Chair_BoR.PDF (last visited June 8, 2016). 
160. Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Chairman), The Select Committee on the 
European Union Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law of 
Repealing Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Heard in Public 2 February 2016,  
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-
justice-subcommittee/potential-impact-of-repealing-the-human-rights-act-on-eu-law/oral/
28347.html (last visited Nov. 8 2016). There was speculation that the previous government’s 
plan to replace the Human Rights Act had been shelved, however the Justice Secretary, Liz 
Truss MP, stated in the House of Commons on September 6, 2016 that the government will 
proceed with plans to replace the Human Rights with a British Bill of Rights. See 
http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/3184e13a-c51f-4940-836b-66c97226e358 (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2016). 
161. Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, supra note 10, at Annex 1, ¶ 2 (covering “Rights, 
Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity.”). 
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Irish law of the ECHR, and to provide "direct access"162 to courts and 
remedies for any alleged breaches of the ECHR. The ECHR also 
applies to the Northern Ireland Assembly since its legislation cannot 
breach the rights contained in the ECHR "and any Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland supplementing it."163 Such legislative proposals 
would be rendered "null and void" should they not be in alignment 
with the Convention rights.164 The incorporation of the ECHR into 
domestic legislation was given effect on October 2, 2000 with the 
1998 Human Rights Act and the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 giving 
statutory footing to these commitments.165 This raises two questions. 
First, would replacing the Human Rights Act with a British or a "UK 
Bill of Rights"166 be a breach of these commitments? Second, is the 
consent of the Northern Ireland legislative Assembly required both in 
terms of repealing the Human Rights Act and also for Brexit? These 
questions will be dealt with respectively. 
Under "what if" scenario one, where a UK Bill of Rights does 
not affect the existing protections under the ECHR, there would be no 
legal or technical breach. What about scenario two, where a UK Bill 
of Rights makes changes to the Convention rights within the meaning 
of the Human Rights Act, resulting in an "ECHR-minus"167 Bill of 
Rights? Arguably under this scenario, there is a "significant risk"168 of 
breaching the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. Such a Bill will 
arguably be "an emaciated version of human rights . . . [and will not] 
further the human-rights-based purposes of the Good Friday/[Belfast] 
Agreement."169 The likelihood of this scenario where a UK Bill of 
                                                                                                             
162. Id. 
163. Id., at Strand I, ¶ 26. 
164. Id. 
165. The Human Rights Act gives “direct effect” to most of the ECHR rights in domestic 
law. Under Northern Ireland Act 1998, §§ 6(1), 6(2)(c), and 7(1) (this Act was passed “to 
make new provision for the government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of implementing 
the agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland . . . .”), the Assembly does not 
have legislative competence for the Human Rights Act and ECHR rights. 
166. Evidence of Gove and Raab to the House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence 
taken before The Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on 
the Potential Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, 2016, Evidence Session 
No. 8 [hereinafter The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact 
on EU Law of Repealing Human Rights Act].   
167. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21. 
168. Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 5. 
169. Aoife O’Donoghue & Ben Warwick, Constitutionally Questioned: UK Debates, 
International  Law and Northern Ireland, 66:1 N.I.L.Q 93, 100 (2015). 
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Rights makes changes to the ECHR is very real, given the admission 
by the former Attorney General before a Select Committee on the 
European Union in February 2016 that "there will be some 
changes"170 to the Human Rights Act. In particular, one of these 
changes refers to Section 2 of the Human Rights Act, which requires 
UK courts to take into account Strasbourg jurisprudence when 
interpreting ECHR rights.171 The former Attorney General believes 
there is an imbalance between the European Court of Human Rights 
and UK courts, with the latter favoring the former.172 For some 
commentators, it is this imbalance and the government’s desire to 
"break the formal link"173 between British courts and the European 
Court of Human Rights that is at the "core"174 of the government’s 
plans. Repetitive references to the UK courts having the ultimate say 
in the interpretation of ECHR rights and the emphasis placed on 
parliamentary sovereignty by the Conservatives in both written 
publications and oral evidence before the various parliamentary 
committees sustains this view. For example, when giving evidence 
before the Select Committee on the Constitution, Michael Gove 
referred to parliamentary sovereignty on several occasions.175 For 
                                                                                                             
170. House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law 
of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166.  
171. House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU Law 
of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166. The Chairman stated that “It is pedestrian to 
state that there is no legal obligation for the UK courts to follow Strasbourg rulings since this 
is ‘almost written as an accepted tenet.’”  
172. See The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on 
EU Law of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166. Mr. Gove states that “Section 2 of 
the Act in particular might put the balance rather too heavily in Strasbourg’s court rather than 
in our own when it comes to the interpretation of those rights.”  
173. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3, at 6. 
174. Grainne Mellon, British Plans to Repeal Human Rights Act Misguided and 
Unnecessary, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/british-plans-
to-repeal-human-rights-act-misguided-and-unnecessary-1.2424110 (last visited Mar. 4, 2016). 
175. “I am attached to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. . . . Parliamentary 
sovereignty is the essence of our democracy.” House of Lords, The Select Committee on the 
Constitution, Oral Evidence Session with the Right Honourable Michael Gove MP, former 
Lord C. Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Dec. 2, 2015. Then, on February 2, 
2016, Mr. Gove stated, “we need to ensure that we uphold parliamentary sovereignty.” In the 
Conservative’s proposals in 2014, there are several references to the UK courts having the 
“final say” and parliamentary sovereignty: “The UK Courts, not Strasbourg, will have the final 
say in interpreting Convention Rights, as clarified by Parliament . . .  It [referring to a British 
Bill of Rights] will ensure that Parliament is the ultimate source of legal authority, and that the 
Supreme Court is indeed supreme in the interpretation of the law . . . In all matters related to 
our international commitments, Parliament is sovereign . . . The European Court of Human 
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those who adopt a broad interpretation of "incorporation" to go 
beyond "incorporating" the text of the ECHR and to include 
Strasbourg rulings, it follows that any forthcoming Bill of Rights that 
prevents UK courts from "taking into account" Strasbourg 
jurisprudence and "the positions of other Council of Europe 
institutions"176 could result in lowering rights protection. This may 
result in a breach of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, as it is 
"remov[ing] one route of effective protection . . . [of] international 
oversight."177 Such oversight is essential in states where 
parliamentary sovereignty is sacrosanct (such as the United Kingdom) 
as it is a way of "controlling [States’] unfettered power."178 
Another way of limiting the effectiveness of this "international 
oversight" is by reducing the European Court of Human Rights to an 
advisory body.179 Other real possibilities include limiting the UK Bill 
of Rights to "the most serious cases";180 preventing "terrorists and 
other serious foreign criminals who pose a threat to our society from 
using spurious human rights arguments to prevent deportation";181 and 
limiting the reach of a UK Bill of Rights to the UK so that British 
troops abroad can "operate effectively in a conflict zone" without 
                                                                                                             
Rights is no longer binding over the UK Supreme Court . . . Labour’s Human Rights Act 
undermines the sovereignty of Parliament, and democratic accountability to the public.” THE 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3, at 4-6. Further, in February 2016, the former Prime 
Minister supported the idea of a Sovereignty Act. Such an Act never materialized and was not 
included in the Queen’s Speech in 2016. See Mark Elliot, Why a Sovereignty Act Makes No 
Legal Sense, PUB. L. FOR EVERYONE BLOG (May 27, 2015), https://publiclawforeveryone  
.com/2015/05/27/why-a-sovereignty-act-makes-no-legal-sense-a-short-response-to-daniel-
hannan-mep/ (last visited June 7, 2016); see also Charles Moore, The Red Herring that was the 
Sovereignty Bill, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/  
eureferendum/12185548/The-red-herring-that-was-the-Sovereignty-Bill.html (last visited Mar. 
25, 2016). The most recent reference to the sovereignty of Parliament is in the Queen’s speech 
in May 2016, where reference is made that “her ministers will uphold the sovereignty of 
Parliament.” THE QUEEN’S SPEECH 2016, supra note 157. For a detailed analysis on this point 
about sovereignty and the British Bill of Rights, see Mark Elliot, The 2016 Queen’s Speech 
and the Constitution, PUB. L. FOR EVERYONE BLOG (May 18, 2016), 
https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/05/18/the-2016-queens-speech-and-the-constitution/. 
176. Human Rights Act (1998) § 2 (Eng.). 
177. Gormally, supra note 4; see also Murray et al., supra note 5; Gallagher et al., supra 
note 5. 
177.  Gormally, supra note 5. 
178.  Id. 
179. THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 3. 
180. Id.   
181. CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO, supra note 156, at 147. 
114 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:1 
being "constrained . . . by a variety of laws and treaties."182 This raises 
issues of compatibility with not only the ECHR, but also international 
human rights and humanitarian law that the United Kingdom signed 
and/or are jus cogens. 
Further, to render the European Court of Human Rights an 
advisory body directly conflicts with Article 46(1) of the ECHR, 
which requires Member States to "undertake to abide by the judgment 
of the court in any case to which they are a parties."183 Nor, given its 
lack of clarity, would limiting cases to "the most serious cases" be 
compatible with the ECHR. The government’s plans are therefore 
trying to reconcile the irreconcilable: instead of building upon the 
protections of the Human Rights Act, the British government is in the 
"unusual and unedifying position"184 of proposing to repeal and 
weaken existing human rights protection. Such a Bill would therefore 
not only be "tamper[ing] with existing human rights protection"185 but 
risk undermining the role the ECHR plays in Northern Ireland under 
the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. The findings of the recent House 
of Lords EU Justice subcommittee on a British Bill of Rights 
concludes that the ECHR and the Human Rights Act plays a "vital 
role" in the implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.186 
The centrality of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement has also 
been recognized by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights. The Commissioner recognizes that the ECHR’s role has a 
"particular resonance" in Northern Ireland . . . where the ECHR is part 
of the Good Friday Agreement, and where the Human Rights Act 
underpins key policing institutions."187 The Irish government has also 
expressed similar sentiments: 
                                                                                                             
182. The House of Lords, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on EU 
Law of Repealing Human Rights Act, supra note 166. 
183 The European Convention on Human Rights, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Docu  
ments/Convention_ENG.pdf  
184. Mellon, supra note 174. 
185. June 15, 2015, Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2015) col. 108, (UK) (Clause 2, the Sewel 
Convention). 
186. The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill 
of Rights, 2015-16, HL 139, at 48, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 
201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf (last visited June 6, 2016). 
187.  Nils Muižnieks, Comm’r for Human Rights, UK: Forthcoming Reforms to Human 
Rights Law Must Not Weaken Protection, COUNCIL EUR. (Jan. 22, 2016), http:// 
www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/uk-forthcoming-reforms-to-human-rights-law-must-not-
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[T]he Good Friday/Belfast Agreement is clear that the European 
Convention on Human Rights must be incorporated into law in 
Northern Ireland….. In addition, a strong human rights 
framework, including external supervision by the European Court 
of Human Rights, has been an essential part of the peace process 
and anything that undermines this, or is perceived to undermine 
this, could have serious consequences for the operation of the 
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.188 
More recently, the Irish government "expressed a very strong view"189 
about the British government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights Act. 
The opposition from the Irish government is welcomed, and if the 
British government continues with its proposals and produces a 
scenario type two Bill of Rights (referred to earlier), the Irish 
government will have to do more than send strongly worded letters 
and issue ministerial statements expressing its strong opposition. It 
will have to hold the British government accountable for failing to 
fulfill its commitment from the 1998 peace agreement to initiate a 
process to progress a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. This argument 
emanates from the Agreement’s dual status: it is both a multi-party 
agreement amongst the main political parties190 and a bi-lateral treaty 
between the British and Irish governments.191 Article 2 of the bilateral 
agreement requires the UK government to implement provisions of 
                                                                                                             
weaken-protection (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). Nils Muižnieks visited the United Kingdom on 
January 22, 2016. Following this visit, he published this speech.  
188. Letter from Frances Fitzgerald, Minister for Justice and Equality, to Michael Gove 
MP, the then Lord Chancellor (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-justice-subcommittee/RepealofHRAeffectonEULaw/Minister-Frances-
Fitzgerald-toSofSJus.pdf. 
189. Pat Leahy, Post-Brexit Repeal of the Human Rights Act Opposed by State, IRISH 
TIMES (July 11, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/uk/post-brexit-repeal-of-human 
 -rights-act-in-north-opposed-by-state-1.2717402 (last visited Aug. 9, 2016). 
190. See generally Christine Bell, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND 
THE LEX PACIFICATORIA (2008) (providing further information on the duality of the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement). With the exception of the DUP who formally opposed and is not a 
signatory of the Agreement. 
191. Compare Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland (Apr. 10, 1998), 2114 U.N.T.S. 
473, with Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (The Good Friday Agreement) (Oct. 4, 1998), Gr. 
Brit.-N. Ir., https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136  
652/agreement.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2016). The Good Friday Agreement is an Annex to 
the treaty and is referred to in its core provisions. The Agreement was incorporated as a treaty 
between the United Kingdom and Ireland and lodged with the United Nations. See 4705 
U.N.T.S. 50. 
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the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement.192 Under the provisions of the 
Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, the NIHRC was mandated to advise 
on "rights supplementary to the ECHR,"193 and on December 10, 
2008, the NIHRC submitted this advice to the British government.194 
The NIHRC interpreted its mandate for advice on a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland to be "ECHR-plus," given the clauses in the 
agreement of which it had been asked to take account.195 These 
clauses "invited"196 the Commission "to consult and to advise on the 
scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary 
to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, [and] to 
reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland."197 As the 
Chief Commissioner of the NIHRC notes in his evidence to the Irish 
Parliament in 2015, this provision is an "implicit recognition of those 
rights and their enforcement in practice."198 As Murray et. al. argue in 
their 2015 report, it is this section of the Agreement that provides a 
prima facie case that the "baseline of the relationship between the law 
of Northern Ireland and the ECHR should be maintained."199 
The peace accord from 1998 has therefore "the agreement of 
both governments in terms of an international Agreement, [which] 
cannot be ignored; it has to be accepted."200 It is an agreement 
between the Executive’s political parties (given that the subsequent St 
Andrews Agreement included the DUP) and the British and Irish 
governments, so all of these stakeholders are required to fulfill their 
                                                                                                             
192. See Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Ireland, Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., art. 2 (Apr. 10, 1998), 2114 
U.N.T.S. 473 Article 2. 
193. Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, § 6 (covering “Rights, Safeguards 
and Equality of Opportunity.”). 
194. A Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland: Advice to the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland, supra note 13. 
195. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21. 
196. Northern Ireland Peace Agreement (The Good Friday Agreement,), Gr. Brit.-N. Ir., 
Section 6, paragraph 4, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Oct. 4, 1998. 
197. Id. 
198. Les Allamby, Chief Comm’r, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission Briefing 
on the Proposal to Repeal the United Kingdom Human Rights Act 1998 and its Potential Effect 
on the Good Friday Agreement, N. IR. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (June 3, 2015), http://www.  
ihrec.ie/download/pdf/nihrc_oireachtas_briefing_good_friday_agreement_25_june_2015.pdf 
at 3 (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). 
199. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 42. 
200. Interview with Alban Maginness, MLA, SDLP, in Belfast (May 1, 2013). 
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obligations as set out in this accord.201 Further under Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the United 
Kingdom is a party, the United Kingdom has the obligation to fulfill 
its promises in good faith and in accordance with its subsequent 
actions.202 Under this article, it is arguable that the UK government 
has not fulfilled its promises to legislate. As part of its guarantee, in 
the Joint Declaration of 2003, the UK government would have been 
expected to set out its own legislative proposals with the receipt of the 
NIHRC’s advice to the Secretary of State in 2008. However, in the 
terms of the Vienna Convention, no "subsequent actions" have 
followed its 2009 consultation on the NIHRC advice203 and a 
continuing stalemate has been accentuated by the UK government’s 
proposals on the repeal of the Human Rights Act. 
As a bilateral interstate agreement, the United Kingdom 
arguably owes obligations to the Republic of Ireland.204 In that 
context, one possibility is international litigation at the International 
Court of Justice ("ICJ").205 Both the United Kingdom and the Irish 
have recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. It is 
technically possible, therefore, for the Irish government to bring a 
case against the UK government for breaching the Good 
Friday/Belfast Agreement. However, there is an important caveat—a 
caveat imposed by the Irish government itself, as it does not recognize 
                                                                                                             
201. See id. “We will establish a forum on a Bill of Rights and convene its inaugural 
meeting in December 2006.” See also Agreement at St Andrews, Gr. Brit.-N. Ir. (Oct. 13, 
2006), ‘Human Rights, Equality, Victims and Other Issues’ Annex B, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_  
andrews_agreement-2.pdf (last visited May 2, 2016).  
202. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31:1, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”). See also Agreement at St Andrews, supra note 201, at art. 31:2 (“The 
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes . . .”), at art. 31:3 (“There shall be taken into account, 
together with the context: (a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions.”). 
203. For reports supporting this conclusion, see, e.g., Murray et al., supra note 5, at 23; 
Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-66.  
204. See generally Murray et al, supra note 5, at 23. This report argues that as 
international treaties owe duties to individuals as well as to states, the United Kingdom is in 
violation of its commitments to the people of Northern Ireland. 
205. Due to space constraint, this article focuses primarily on litigation as one possible 
mechanism. For other options, see Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-66; Murray et al., supra 
note 5, at 27-58. 
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compulsory jurisdiction if there are issues relating to Northern 
Ireland.206 
Another possibility is to lodge an interstate case using the special 
procedure of Article 33 of the ECHR (brought by one member of the 
Council of Europe against another) if the government proceeds with 
its plans of repealing the Human Rights Act.207 Any Contracting Party 
under the ECHR would be effectively fulfilling its obligations under 
Article 46 (1) of the ECHR. If the United Kingdom were to proceed 
with its plans to not comply with decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights, viewing them as advisory only, this would be a 
violation of international law with the United Kingdom arguably 
breaching its obligations to other Contracting Parties.208 While such a 
decision would not be "taken lightly,"209 it is open to the Irish 
government to consider taking such action if an "ECHR-minus"210 
Bill of Rights prevails.211 In that context, the political stalemate on the 
Northern Ireland Bill of Rights could potentially be shifted. 
The second question raised earlier is whether the consent of the 
devolved regions is required for the introduction of both a UK Bill of 
Rights and Brexit under the Sewel Convention.212 The Sewel 
                                                                                                             
206. This idea is borrowed from Professor Chris McCrudden’s presentation on “The 
Constitutional Significance of the Human Rights Act in Northern Ireland” at a conference on 
“The Impact of the Human Rights Act in Northern Ireland,” Belfast (Jan. 26, 2016), on file 
with the author. See also Chris McCrudden & Gordon Anthony, Potential Impact of Repealing 
the Human Rights Act on EU Law, Oral Evidence to the EU Justice Subcommittee (Jan. 26, 
2016); EU Justice Sub-Committee, PARLIAMENT LIVE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://parliament 
live.tv/Event/Index/1392eebe-aa68-4ad5-83b2-3aa2eca7440e. 
207. European Convention on Human Rights art. 33 (Nov. 4, 1950). Article 33 states 
“Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.” See also Murray 
et al., supra note 5, at 56-57 (providing further discussion on this option).  
        208. Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 63-64. 
        209. Irish Government to Reopen the Case of the Hooded Men, IRISH IN BRITAIN, 
http://www.irishinbritain.org/news-and-events/124/irish-government-to-reopen-the-case-of-the 
 -hooded-men (last visited Mar. 16, 2016). 
210. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 21. 
211. Id. Murray, O’Donoghue, and Warwick highlight the fact that the Irish Government 
has re-opened a previous inter-state case (Ireland v. United Kingdom 2 Eur. H. R. Rep. EHRR 
25 (1978)) shows its commitment to maintaining human rights standards. 
212. This Convention is named after Lord Sewel, who stated during the debate on the 
Scottish Bill 1998 that “we would expect a convention to be established that Westminster 
would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in Scotland without the consent 
of the Scottish parliament.” See 592 Parl Deb HL (1998) col. 768-80021. Thereafter, this was 
referred to as the Sewel Convention. 
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Convention recognizes that the Westminster Parliament has the 
ultimate authority to pass legislation on all matters, irrespective of 
whether they are devolved/transferred or reserved/excepted. However, 
the Westminster Parliament will not legislate on devolved/transferred 
matters in the absence of an "agreement/legislative consent motion" 
of the devolved legislature.213 The applicability of this Convention, as 
far as repealing the Human Rights Act is concerned, hinges on 
whether it is a devolved or a reserved matter. The UK government’s 
position is unclear on this: "it is neither reserved nor devolved."214 To 
quote Lord Blair of Boughton, "[i]t is like saying that you feel a little 
bit pregnant; it is just not possible. It is either reserved or 
devolved."215 To shed some clarity on this issue, the authors put 
forward two schools of thought.216 Under a narrow reading of the 
Sewel Convention, as the Human Rights Act is not a 
devolved/transferred matter,217 any repeal of the Human Rights Act 
arguably would not violate the Sewel Convention, as it would not be 
                                                                                                             
213. The Sewel Convention is embodied in the September 2012 Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MoU”) between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In the explanatory section, it states: “This paper, 
superseding Command Paper Cm 5240 published in December 2001, comprises a series of 
agreements between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland setting out the principles which underlie relations between them. It is not 
intended that these agreements should be legally binding.” DEVOLUTION MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS, AND THE NORTHERN 
IRELAND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY COMMAND OF HER 
MAJESTY AND PRESENTED TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND 
ASSEMBLY AND LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 3 (October 2013), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/316157/MoU_b
etween_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2016). The 
MoU describes the Sewel Convention in similar language: “The UK Government will proceed 
in accordance with the convention that the UK Parliament would not normally legislate with 
regard to devolved matters except with the agreement of the devolved legislature. The 
devolved administrations will be responsible for seeking such agreement as may be required 
for this purpose on an approach from the UK Government.” Id. at 8. 
214. Michael Gove, House of Lords, Revised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before The 
Select Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential 
Impact on EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session no. 8, Questions 79-
90 (Feb. 2, 2016).  
215. Lord Blair of Boughton, House of Lords, The Select Committee on the European 
Union Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on Potential Impact on EU Law of Repealing the 
Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, Questions 79 – 90 (Feb. 2, 2016). 
216. This idea is borrowed from Chris McCrudden. See supra note 206 and 
accompanying text.   
217. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 7 (1) (b). 
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legislating upon a Northern Ireland/devolved issue. However, under a 
broader reading of the Convention, any repeal of the Human Rights 
Act would trigger the Convention, as the UK parliament would be 
legislating "with regard to devolved matters . . . which affects the 
scope of the legal authority of a devolved legislature or a devolved 
administration."218 This is due to the explicit wording of the Northern 
Ireland Act, as it expressly requires the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and Executive to observe and implement "obligations under the 
Human Rights Convention,"219 and the devolved institutions are 
expressly prohibited from diminishing the ECHR rights and 
protections.220 
If the UK Bill of Rights was to reduce the existing protections 
provided under the ECHR (as in scenario two above), the Sewel 
Convention would apply.221 Would such a consent motion be 
forthcoming? This is hard to predict given the narrow vote in a recent 
debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly on the repeal of the Human 
Rights Act.222 The Assembly Members narrowly voted against 
                                                                                                             
        218. Alan Trench, Legislative Consent and the Sewel Convention, DEVOLUTION 
MATTERS (June 2016), https://devolutionmatters.wordpress.com/the-sewel-convention/. For a 
lively discussion on the differing views on this issue, see Iain Jamieson, The Repeal of the 
Human Rights Act and the Sewel Convention in Scotland, SCOTTISH CONST. FUTURES F. (June 
12, 2015), http://www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost 
/tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5741/Iain-Jamieson-The-Repeal-of-the-Human-
Rights-Act-and-the-Sewel-Convention-in-Scoltand.aspx; see also Mark Elliot, HRA Watch: 
Reform, Repeal, Replace? Could the Devolved Nations Block Repeal of the Human Rights Act 
and the Enactment of a New Bill of Rights?, U.K. CONST. L. ASS’N (May 16, 2015),  
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/05/16/hra-watch-reform-repeal-replace-mark-elliott-
could-the-devolved-nations-block-repeal-of-the-human-rights-act-and-the-enactment-of-a-
new-bill-of-rights/. 
219. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, sch. 2, ¶ 3.. 
220. Northern Ireland Act 1998, c. 47, § 24(1)(a). The same applies to Scotland and 
Wales under the Scotland Act 1998, § 29(2)(d), § 57(2) and the Government of Wales Act 
2006, c. 32,  § 81(1). 
221. Bates et al., supra note 5, at 10-14; Gallagher et al., supra note 5, at 6, 53; 
Gormally, supra note 5; Murray et al., supra note 5, at 13-15; Colm O’Cinneide, Human 
Rights, Devolution and the Constrained Authority of the Westminster Parliament, U.K. CONST. 
L. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2013), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org. 
222. 105 NIA Deb (2015) col. 2 1, http://www.theyworkforyou.com/ni/?id=2015-06-
01.6.1#g6.79. House of Lords EU Justice subcommittee on the Potential Impact of Repealing 
the Human Rights Act on EU Law to the Parliamentary EU Justice Sub-Committee, 
PARLIAMENT LIVE (Jan. 26, 2016), http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/1392eebe-aa68-4ad5-
83b2-3aa2eca7440e (last visited Mar. 24 2016). In oral evidence by Professors McCrudden 
and Anthony, they note that such consent would not be forthcoming. See McCrudden & 
Anthony, supra note 206. This reflects the final conclusions of the House of Lords EU Justice 
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repealing the Human Rights Act, with the two main Unionists parties 
voting in favor.223 It is possible that the UK government could ignore 
the Convention, as it is not legally enforceable,224 but it could be 
entering into "unchartered constitutional territory."225 As a leading 
constitutional lawyer states, "the justiciability of the Convention will 
ultimately be decided by the UK Supreme Court."226 Until this matter 
is agreed,227 several commentators agree that if the UK government 
                                                                                                             
subcommittee’s report. See The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU 
and a British Bill of Rights, 12th Report of Session 2015-2016, May 9, 2016 (“The evidence 
demonstrates that the Northern Ireland Assembly [is] unlikely to give consent to a Bill of 
Rights which repealed the Human Rights Act.”). House of Lords EU Justice Subcommittee, 
The UK, The EU, and a British Bill of Rights, 2015-16, HL 139, http://www.  
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf at 52 (last visited June. 
6, 2016). 
223. Gormally, supra note 5. Even if such a motion were to be introduced, this would 
“almost certainly be met with a Petition of Concern and thereby fail to achieve the necessary 
agreement.”  
224. This is clearly stated in the MoU between the UK government and the devolved 
regions: “It is not intended that these agreements should be legally binding.” DEVOLUTION 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS, AND 
THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY 
COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY AND PRESENTED TO THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT AND THE 
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY AND LAID BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FOR WALES 3 
(Oct. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/316157/MoU_between_the_UK_and_the_Devolved_Administrations.pdf.  However, it is 
important to note that the Sewel Convention is both a Convention and a statute in Scotland. 
This followed a recommendation by the Smith Commission. See THE SMITH COMMISSION, 
REPORT OF THE SMITH COMMISSION FOR FURTHER DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO THE 
SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT 13 (Nov. 27, 2014) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/ 
28_11_14_smithcommission.pdf. This issue was also debated in the Scottish Parliament. See  
The Sewel Convention, Scotland Bill, Clause 2 June 2015, Parl Deb HC (2015) c10815 
(2015). The Scotland Act 2016 received royal assent on March 23, 2016. See also Scotland 
Act 2016, § 2, for a specific reference to the Sewel Convention. 
225. The House of Lords European Union Committee, The UK, the EU and a British Bill 
of Rights, 12th Report of Session 2015-2016 42 (May 9, 2016), http://www.publications.  
parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/139/139.pdf. 
226. See id.; Michael Zander, Will It Ever Come to Pass? NEW L. J. 11, 12 (2015). The 
issue of justiciability was also discussed in the House of Lord’s Select Committee on the 
Constitution. House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence taken before The Select 
Committee on the European Union, Justice Sub-Committee Inquiry on the Potential Impact on 
EU Law of Repealing the Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No. 8, supra note 159, at 
Questions 79-90. During this debate, Mr. Gove acknowledged that an “attempt” could be made 
by someone to bring a case before the courts, but he hoped that the courts would agree with the 
Government’s intention and admitted that this would be a matter for the courts to decide.  
227. Chris McCrudden uses what is referred to as the Partition Reference case in 
Canada, Re Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (1981) 1 S.C.R. 753, as an example 
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were to impose what has been labeled "a major legislative 
imposition"228 without the consent of the devolved administrations, 
this unilateral action could be viewed as not only 
"unconstitutional,"229 but such legislation would be "more difficult to 
achieve politically."230 As the government itself has admitted: 
. . . the devolution settlements not only acknowledge, but support 
the idea that a blanket, “one-size-fits-all” approach is not always 
appropriate for the diverse histories, needs, and priorities across 
the UK. There have been and remain different levels of demand, 
in different contexts, for devolution in England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland. Devolution is asymmetric in nature 
precisely to reflect and support the variations of all these 
factors.231 
To proceed with what has been described as an "unpalatable"232 
course of action would undermine and be "at variance with the 
devolution settlement[s],"233 and potentially risking undermining the 
relationship between the constituent parts of the United Kingdom.234 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights also recognizes the 
importance of giving the devolved institutions a "full opportunity to 
contribute" on this issue.235 Likewise, the Council of Europe 
                                                                                                             
where the justiciability of a convention was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. See 
McCrudden, supra note 206; see also House of Lords’ European Union Committee ‘12th 
Report of Session 2015–16’ HL Paper 139, May 9, 2016; Peter C. Oliver Constitutional 
Conventions in the Canadian Courts, UK CONST. L. ASS’N (Nov. 4, 2011), https://  
ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/11/04/peter-c-oliver-constitutional-conventions-in-the-canadian-
courts/. 
228. Murray et al. supra note 5. 
229. Id. 
230. Bates et al., supra note 5, at 12. 
231. Government Response to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee Fourth Report of Session 2012-13: Do We Need a Constitutional 
Convention for the UK (2013), Cm. 8749, at 7. 
232. Gallagher et al, supra note 5, at 54. 
233. Murray et al., supra note 5, at 15. 
234. Id. 
235. Letter from the Chair of the Joint Comm’n. on Human Rights to Mitchell 
McLaughlin, former Speaker of the N. Ir. Assembly (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.parliament.  
uk/documents/joint-committees/human-rights/BoR_purdah_letter_(NI).pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 
2016). The Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly replied to this letter on February 29, 
2016 stating that he is “glad” the Committee is seeking to ensure the devolved regions play an 
important role in this debate and highlighted the division within the Northern Ireland 
Assembly on repealing the Human Rights Act citing the assembly debate on June 1, 2015. 
Letter from Mitchel McLaughlin to Rt Hon Harriet Harman MP/Chair of the Joint Comm’n. 
 
2016] BREXIT, REPEAL OF HRA & N. IRELAND BOR 123 
Commissioner for Human Rights has encouraged more consultation 
with the devolved regions.236 In contrast, the former Lord Chancellor 
was reluctant to "pronounce definitively"237 on this matter as he 
wanted to wait and see "what is in any given Bill in order to be 
absolutely certain as to whether a legislative consent Motion might be 
required in any of the devolved legislatures."238 Arguably, this means 
that the government’s position as to whether a legislative consent 
motion is necessary is "an open question."239 
The British government’s position on whether consent from the 
Northern Ireland Assembly (and the other devolved assemblies) is 
needed to leave the European Union following Brexit is also an open 
question. As far as the British government is concerned, although they 
will be consulting and working with the Northern Ireland Executive 
and the Scottish government, "ultimately it is parliament’s decision 
whether we [the government] repeal the 1972 European Communities 
Act or whether we don’t."240 While we do not disagree with one of the 
most fundamental doctrines underpinning UK constitutional law as 
EU law is entrenched in the devolution settlement,241 the House of 
Lords report on the process of withdrawing from the European Union 
states it "has no reason"242 to believe that legislative consent is not 
needed from all of the devolved assemblies. Would such consent be 
forthcoming? One source has estimated that about one-third of the 
                                                                                                             
on Human Rights (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/  
human-rights/Letter_from_Mitchel_Mclaughlin_290216.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
236. The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, visited 
the United Kingdom on January 22, 2016. Following this visit, he published a speech. See 
Muižnieks supra note 187. 
237. House of Lords, Revised transcript of evidence taken before The Select Committee 
on the Constitution, Oral Evidence with the Rt. Hon. Michael Gove MP, former Lord 
Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Evidence Session No. 1, Questions 1-12 (Dec. 2, 
2015). 
238. Id. 
239. Id.  
240. EU referendum: Theresa Villiers Says Parliament is Sovereign, BBC NEWS (June 
26, 2016), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36633939. The European 
Communities Act is the piece of legislation that allowed the United Kingdom to join the then 
European Economic Community. 
241. Northern Ireland Act 1998 § 6(2)(d). 
242. HM GOVERNMENT, THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION 
(Feb. 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/  
file/504216/The_process_for_withdrawing_from_the_EU_print_ready.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 
2016). 
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Assembly’s members support Brexit (DUP, TUV, and some from the 
UUP, although the leader of the UUP voted to remain, and possibly 
People Before Profit).243 The other parties (Sinn Féin, Alliance, 
SDLP, and the Green Party) are pro-Remain.244 Indeed, all of the pro-
Remain parties are part of a current legal challenge arguing that if the 
prime minister, Theresa May, fails to address legal obligations 
relating to Northern Ireland and to the peace process before the legal 
mechanism to withdraw from the European Union is triggered,245 the 
political parties alongside human rights activists will launch a legal 
case.246 One of the issues raised by the legal team representing the 
cross-community of coalition of politicians and human rights activists 
is the need for a legislative consent motion to be carried out by the 
Assembly. 
If such legislative consent is not forthcoming, could the British 
government proceed with Brexit even though the democratic will of 
the Northern Ireland electorate voted to remain within the European 
Union? As stated earlier, under the doctrine of parliamentary 
constitutionally, the UK parliament has the authority to do so. As one 
Northern Ireland politician states: 
. . . ultimately there [is] nothing the regional parliaments could do 
. . . We would have the opportunity to make decisions over 
specific EU rules and laws that actually apply in Northern Ireland 
. . . However, parliament remains with primacy, it can take back 
                                                                                                             
243. Jonathan Tonge, Brexit: Leaving May Need Consent of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, IRISH TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/ 
world/uk/brexit-leaving-may-need-consent-of-scotland-wales-and-northern-ireland-1.2700810. 
        244.  Sinn Féin, Alliance, SDLP and the Green Party all campaigned for a remain vote. 
See DUP Confirms It Will Campaign for Brexit in Leave/Remain Referendum, BELFAST 
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2016), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/dup-
confirms-it-will-campaign-for-brexit-in-leaveremain-referendum-34470806.html. 
245. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union to the European Council allows a 
member state to withdraw from the European Union. This allows for a two-year negotiation 
period between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU member states. See HOUSE OF 
COMMONS LIBRARY, LEAVING THE  EU, 9-14 (July 1, 2013), http://researchbriefings.files.  
parliament.uk/documents/RP13-42/RP13-42.pdf.  
246. Steven McCaffery, Brexit Set to Face Legal Challenge in Northern Ireland, DETAIL 
(July 25, 2016), http://www.thedetail.tv/articles/brexit-set-to-face-legal-challenge-in-northern-
ireland. There are also other legal cases pending in London. See Mishcon de Reya, Article 50 
Process on Brexit Faces Legal Challenges to Ensure Parliamentary Involvement, MISHCON DE 
REYA LLP (July 3, 2016), http://www.mishcon.com/news/firm_news/article_50_process_ 
on_brexit_faces_legal_challenge_to_ensure_parliamentary_involvement_07_2016.  
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power from Holyrood, it can take back power from the assembly, 
so let’s not kid ourselves.247 
On a constitutional level, the authors agree with this statement. 
However, as EU law is part of the devolution settlement, such an 
approach would be politically hazardous, as it would greatly 
undermine the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. One of the key 
provisions of the Agreement is the right of citizenship that entitles 
anyone born in Northern Ireland to have dual citizenship (meaning 
Irish or British or both). As Fintan O’Toole, the Irish Times journalist 
asks, "[w]hat does that mean in the new dispensation? Can someone 
be both an EU citizen and not an EU citizen?"248 While Westminster 
can constitutionally assert its right to withdraw Northern Ireland and 
Scotland from the European Union, it ignores "the reality that 
Westminster is no longer politically capable of enforcing that 
right."249 
While a legislative consent motion for Brexit and for repealing 
the Human Rights Act remains an open question, this is in stark 
contrast to the British government’s position on a Northern Ireland 
Bill of Rights, where legislative consent amongst the Northern Ireland 
political parties is demanded before the same government will 
introduce legislation at Westminster: 
. . . a legislative consent motion must be passed by the Assembly 
in circumstances where the government brings forward any 
legislation at Westminster such as a Bill of Rights which will 
have a significant impact on devolved policy. … The British 
government is happy to move, but there is no point in moving 
until we have achieved some sort of consensus which is very 
much lacking at the moment.250 
                                                                                                             
247. EU referendum: Theresa Villiers Says Parliament is Sovereign, supra note 240.  
248. Fintan O’Toole, The English Have Placed a Bomb Under the Irish Peace Process, 
THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/ 
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249. Jo Murkens, Westminster Must Choose Between Leaving the EU and Retaining the 
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250. Owen Paterson, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, quoted in Mark Hennessy, 
Stormont Agreement Needed for Rights Bill, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 23, 2010); see also Theresa 
Villiers, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Westminster Hall (2013) in 16 Parl 
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However, a precedent exists: in 2007, the British government 
intervened at the regional level because the Northern Ireland 
Assembly was unable to reach consensus on the transposition of the 
EU Gender Directive on Goods and Services (2004/113/EC). This 
Directive implements the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services. Due to 
lack of cross-party agreement on the issue of transgender in the 
regulations,251 when consent was not forthcoming, the British 
government took forward the legislation for Northern Ireland.252 
Under section 26 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, the UK 
government has the power to direct action (including legislation) to be 
taken by a Northern Ireland Minister in order to fulfill international 
obligations.253 However, these powers have not been exercised in 
relation to the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. Instead, the 
government has invented a requirement of cross-party consensus254 to 
implement the international obligation of the Northern Ireland Bill of 
Rights. As the British government is well aware, there is no such 
consensus and, as such, the political stalemate continues. The next 
section addresses how this political stalemate could potentially be 
shifted. 
                                                                                                             
251. The then First Minister opposed introducing legislation on the basis that he was “not 
agreeable” due to “the explicit inclusion of reference to transgender or gender reassignment in 
the regulations.” As the Committee on the Administration of Justice (“CAJ”) points out, 
“whilst gender reassignment is a different matter to sexual orientation, a DUP colleague on the 
Committee, Stephen Moutray, stated their concern was that ‘Bible-believing Christians would 
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(May 2015), http://www.caj.org.uk/files/2015/05/08/S443_CAJs_submission_to_DCAL_ 
consultation_on_Irish_Language_Bill_May_2015.pdf.  
252. The authors are grateful to Daniel Holder, Deputy Director of the CAJ, for bringing 
this example to our attention. 
         253.  Northern Ireland Act 1998 § 26(2) (“If the Secretary of State considers that any 
action capable of being taken by a Minister or Northern Ireland department is required for the 
purpose of giving effect to any international obligations, of safeguarding the interests of 
defence or national security or of protecting public safety or public order, he may by order 
direct that the action shall be taken.”).  
        254. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD 
We conclude that an agreed framework between the 
governments would provide an opportunity to ascertain the extent of 
agreement and/or disagreement on the proposals put forward by the 
NIHRC and the main political parties. In establishing a process for 
discussions between the parties, as part of this framework, the parties 
should be asked to address the question as to what they understand to 
be the role of a Bill of Rights. Answers to such questions should be 
used as the basis for banking agreement and building consensus. The 
parties should be encouraged to design a set of agreed principles from 
which they can agree on the rights appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of Northern Ireland using the NIHRC’s advice (and 
any further advice) as a tool to assist with their decision making. 
What might work best could be a combination of elements: a 
framework that clearly identifies the objective and how it will be 
achieved; commitment from the British and Irish governments to 
assist the process; and a variety of useful tools designed to help 
political parties carry out their discussions effectively. In addition, a 
high-level third party champion could help facilitate the discourse. 
Dialogue is important to gauge what the parties wish to achieve in 
terms of outcomes. Some consideration should be given to identify 
not only a respected third party for the process but also to identify a 
location where dedicated discussions can take place away from the 
glare of publicity and media speculation. 
In this regard, the model involved in taking forward police 
reform following the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement could be used 
as an exemplar given that a series of roundtable events took place in 
and out of Northern Ireland providing neutral and safe spaces for 
parties to discuss a range of options. It is critical that in any future 
process, the political parties benefit from the experience of 
independent human rights experts and those with expertise in scoping 
out or drafting Bills of Rights. The process has to also respect the 
United Kingdom’s obligations under international law.255 This need 
was evidenced in our empirical findings where there were a number 
                                                                                                             
255. See Anne Smith, The Drafting Process of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, PUB. 
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of misunderstandings amongst some political parties on what a Bill of 
Rights can and cannot deliver. 
The authors have already embarked on a series of roundtable 
discussions on a Bill of Rights; the first was in Belfast on December 
14, 2015. The British and Irish governments were represented, as 
were the main political parties and representatives from the NIHRC 
and civil society.256 The feedback was positive and the importance of 
holding such an event was highlighted where the parties could be 
provided with the space to work out their differences and ascertain a 
level of common ground. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the local political actors will not take the lead on 
the outstanding issue of a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights because the 
requisite political will is lacking and there is insufficient technical and 
legal capacity to do so.257 It is also evident that the UK government’s 
plan to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights, 
alongside the decision to leave the European Union, has created an 
extra layer of complexity in the steps needed to progress a Northern 
Ireland Bill of Rights. In light of these recent political developments, 
a "double argument" exists258 for Northern Ireland to have its own 
Bill of Rights incorporating the ECHR and the EU-related rights. 
Indeed, as human rights are devolved, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
(or any of the devolved legislatures) could replace the Human Rights 
Act with another Act with the same level of rights protection as exists 
under the ECHR and the European Union. However, two important 
points must be made. First, the wording of the Good Friday/Belfast 
Agreement specifically stipulates that the rights in a Bill of Rights are 
to be "supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human 
                                                                                                             
256. There were representatives from the Alliance Party, SDLP, Sinn Féin, UUP, and the 
DUP. The Green Party sent their apologies, the TUV, PUP, and NI21 did not respond to the 
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Rights."259 The Human Rights Act was to be a "place-holder 
measure"260 until Northern Ireland had its own Bill of Rights. Second, 
a cautionary note is needed in relation to passing legislation perceived 
to be contentious, since the use of the petition of concern can act as a 
veto and block further progress in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
The UK government pledges its "strong support for the political 
institutions established over the past two decades as a result of the 
various Agreements" in the same manifesto in which it set out the 
repeal of the Human Rights Act and the referendum on the European 
Union.261 As Fintan O’Toole notes, "Northern Ireland is not 
Lincolnshire or Somerset. It is a distinct and unique political entity, 
recognised as such by an international treaty registered with the 
United Nations: the Belfast Agreement of 1998."262 In line with this 
peace accord, the Northern Ireland Bill of Rights is, and should 
continue to be seen as, a separate process, independent of and 
unfettered by the UK debate about a British Bill of Rights. As noted 
earlier, this was one of the findings of the UK Bill of Rights 
Commission’s report, and this argument has been endorsed at the 
international level, with several UN bodies calling on the British 
government to "expedite the enactment"263 of a Northern Ireland Bill 
of Rights "without delay."264 This article argues that the time has 
arrived for the UK government to uphold its international legal 
obligations or be brought to task for not doing so. Since the current 
situation has raised a range of issues in relation to a Bill of Rights for 
Northern Ireland, that is where the silver lining may yet be found. 
 
                                                                                                             
259. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, supra note 10, at ¶ 4, 16-17 (covering 
“Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity”). 
260.  Murray et al. supra note 5. 
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262. Fintan O’Toole, Belfast Agreement is a Threat to the New English Nationalism, 
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263. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding Observations 
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